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ANATOMY OF A BIT:




Foreign direct investment1 influences the world economy by
promoting the transfer of capital, technology and managerial
skills, improving economic efficiency through greater competition
and enhancing market access.' The United States and Honduras,
appreciating the benefits of foreign direct investment (FDI) while
mindful of the shortcomings of customary international law' and
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1. See U.N. Ctr. On Transnational Corporations & Int'l Chamber Of Commerce,
Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, 1992, at preface iii, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/136,
U.N. Sales No. E.92 II.A.16, I.C.C. Sales No. 508 [hereinafter Bilateral Investment
Treaties 1959-1991].
2. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 41
n.37 (1994).
3. See generally CLIVE PARRY ET AL., ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 82 (1987); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (2) (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAw] (providing that customary international law requires "a concordant
practice of a number of States acquiesced in by others and a conception that the
practice is required by or consistent with the prevailing law (the opinio juris)").
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the absence of a multilateral accord on FDI,4 entered into negotia-
tions to promote and protect foreign investment in their respective
countries. Subsequent to the conclusion of those negotiations, the
Honduran Congress and the United States Senate ratified the
Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Republic of Honduras Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment.'
The agreement achieved by Honduras6 and the United States7
is a bilateral investment treaty (BIT).' Bilateral investment trea-
ties, the origins of which extend from a 1959 agreement between
the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan,9 are international
covenants intended to foster foreign direct investment by
extending protection from noncommercial, political risks.10 The
intense worldwide treaty activity of recent years attests to the
importance of FDI from the perspective of both capital exporting,
as well as capital importing countries." It is also recognition by
4. See The Sinking of the MAI, ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 1998, at 81; UK Admits
Failure After French Talks Withdrawal, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 18, 1998, at 14.
5. See Treaty Concerning The Encouragement And Reciprocal Protection Of
Investments, July 1, 1995, U.S.-Hond., Treaty Doc. 106-27 [hereinafter United States
- Honduras Investment Treaty]; See also Gary G. Yerkey, Senate Ratifies Bilateral
Treaties on Investment With 10 Countries, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1630 (Oct. 26,
2000) (discussing U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky's statement on the
senate ratification of ten investment treaties, including the treaty with Honduras).
6. See generally UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2003 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS at 157; U.S. COMMERCIAL SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, 2002 COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE FOR HONDURAS,
available at http://www.usatrade.gov/Website/CCG.nsf/ShowCCG?OpenForm&
Country=HONDURAS (addressing investment conditions in Honduras). (This
internet cite no longer exists in the listed location)
7. See generally Barbara Hagenbaugh, China Draws More Foreign Money Than
USA, USA TODAY, Sept. 5, 2003, at 3B (stating that worldwide foreign direct
investment in 2002 was U.S. $651.2 billion and that foreign direct investment in the
United States fell to U.S. $30 billion in 2002 from a high of U.S. $314 billion in 2000);
Michael Youssef, Direct Investment Positions in 2001, INT'L EcoN. REV.17 (U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n ed. USCIT Publication 3612) (discussing the flow of direct investment
into and out of the United States in 2001).
8. See BUREAU OF ECON. AND Bus. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATY PROGRAM, (July 1, 2003) [hereinafter U.S. BIT PROGRAM]
(addressing the objectives of the United States in negotiating investment treaties).
9. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries 24 INT'L
LAW 665 (1990).
10. See Louis HENKIN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 764,
1446 (3rd ed. 1993); see also Brian M. McKell, Protecting the Balance Sheet Against
Political Risk, 32 INT'L L. NEWS 1 (Summer 2003) (discussing methods of protecting
foreign investment against non-economic, political risks).
11. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 225; See also Teresa McGhie, Bilateral and
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the United States that the American Treaties of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation (FCN),12 the predecessors to bilateral
investment treaties, inadequately protect the overseas invest-
ments of Americans.13
Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
originated 4 in an era where international commercial activity
principally involved merchants trading goods. 5 Contemporary
international commercial activity involves the physical establish-
ment of operations beyond the borders of the investor's home
state. The increasing flow of international direct investment, the
increasing complexity of international economic relations between
states and investors, and the expansion of BIT's to encompass dis-
pute settlement between host states and investors" resulted in
investment treaties being drafted with greater detail, the inter-
pretation of BIT's from a more legalistic perspective and the reso-
lution of investment disputes in a more judicial rather than
diplomatic manner.
The treaty between Honduras and the United States, the
fourth BIT between the United States and a Central or South
American country, 7 represents a BIT crafted with greater empha-
sis on dispute resolution."8 Expropriation, of foremost concern of
past treaty negotiators, 9 is now relegated to a lesser role as inves-
Multilateral Investment Treaties, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
107 (Daniel D. Bradlow & Alfred Escher eds., 1999); U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION ON
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN 1998 REPORT, U.N. Doc.LC/G.2042-P, U.N. Sales No. E.98.II.G.14
(1998).
12. See generally Fritz Munich, Treaties ofFriendship, Commerce and Navigation,
in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 484, (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1984)
(discussing the Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation).
13. See SoRNARm AH, supra note 2, at 229.
14. See PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHEN KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL RISK 104
(1997) (The first treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation entered into by the
United States with France was negotiated by Benjamin Franklin, Arthur Lee and
Silas Deane shortly after the signing of the Declaration of Independence.); See also
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14
MICH. J. INT'L L. 621, 624-25 (1993).
15. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 229.
16. See Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, supra note 1, at 11.
17. See President's Message to the Senate Transmitting the Honduras - United
States Bilateral Investment Treaty With Documentation, 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1199 (May 23, 2000) [hereinafter President's Message to the Senate].
18. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, arts. IX-X;
infra Consultation and Dispute Resolution.
19. See Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, supra note 1, at 11.
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tor-state dispute resolution rises appreciably in importance." The
significance placed on dispute resolution provisions in contempo-
rary BIT's and the increasing recourse by investors to interna-
tional arbitration 21 enables investors to direct and control
investor-state disagreements. The resolution of investor-state
investment differences will, however, continue to remain difficult.
While recent BIT negotiations, including those between the
United States and Honduras, have committed greater resources to
the dispute settlement features of investment treaties, numerous
other aspects of the treaties remain vague and ambiguous.
The intended or unintended ambiguities in the United States
- Honduras bilateral investment treaty are the focus of this arti-
cle. The treaty will be analyzed from the perspective of an inves-
tor or a state either contemplating or engaged in dispute
resolution. The purpose of highlighting ambiguities in the agree-
ment is to provide investors and states engaged in dispute negoti-
ations or formal dispute resolution with a thorough understanding
of their positions. A secondary aim is to enable the negotiators of




The United States - Honduras investment treaty closely par-
allels the 1994 United States prototype investment treaty. 2 It
consists of a title, a preamble,2 sixteen articles, an annex and a
protocol. The title and the preamble provide an understanding of
the goals and objectives of the treaty, but are not, by the express
20. See International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Deputy
Secretary-General Antonio Parra, Presentation to the International Dispute
Resolution Committee, Section of International Law and Practice, American Bar
Association (June 24, 2002) (stating that the Centre receives one to two new cases
each month and that "not very long ago this was the annual rate").
21. See id.
22. See generally 1994 Prototype Treaty, Treaty Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the [Country] Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, revised Apr. 1998 (available
from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Office of Services, Investments and
Intellectual Property Rights); TRADE UNIT, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES,
Investment Agreements in the Western Hemisphere: A Compendium (Oct. 1999),
available at http://www.sice.oas/bites/asp (providing a study prepared for the Free
Trade Areas of the Americas, Working Group on Investments, undertaken by the
Trade Unit of the Organization of American States).
23. See infra Preamble.
US-HONDURAS BIT
indication of the Parties, part of the treaty.24 The substantive law
of the agreement is found in the articles2 5 and the Annex. The
Protocol clarifies the intentions of the Parties with respect to spe-
cific aspects of the treaty.26
Article I provides definitions for technical words and phrases
employed in the other articles," including an extensive definition
of "investment."2 8 Articles I129 and X13 0 set the standards of treat-
ment to be accorded investors and investments from the earliest
stage of establishing an investment through its ultimate disposi-
tion. Article II also provides for a treaty Annex through which
Honduras and the United States may make exceptions to their
Article II treatment obligations."
Articles III and IV address expropriation32 and the obligations
of the host state for investment losses caused by war or other civil
disturbances.3 Article V concerns financial transfers relating to
investments, including the repatriation of profits.14 Article VI pro-
hibits the Parties from mandating or enforcing specific conditions,
such as export requirements, as prerequisites for undertaking or
operating an investment. The entitlement of investors or their
representatives to enter and remain in the territories of Honduras
and the United States is set forth in Article VII3 6
The resolution of treaty differences between the United
States and Honduras, as well as the methodology for resolving
investment disputes between an investor and a host state, are pro-
vided for in Articles VIII through X." These articles address the
obligation of the states to engage in state-to-state consultation8
and, if necessary, binding arbitration. 9
Article XII reserves to Honduras and the United States the
24. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, Preamble.
25. See infra Scope of Application.
26. MADELINE ALBRIGHT, DEP'T OF STATE, LETTER OF SUBMITTAL, May 1, 2000, S.
Treaty Doc. 106-27, at v (2000) [hereinafter Albright].
27. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. I.
28. See id. art. I(d).
29. See id. art. LI.
30. See id. art. XI.
31. See id. art. II(2)(a) and Annex.
32. See id. art. III.
33. See id. art. IV.
34. See id. art. V.
35. See id. art. VI.
36. See id. art. VII.
37. See id. arts. VIII - X.
38. See id. art. VIII.
39. See id. arts. IX and X.
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right to withhold the benefits of the treaty from certain investors
when nationals of a third country own or control the investment."
In Article XIII, the treaty establishes that it does not apply to
matters of taxation, with limited exceptions.4 Article XIV entitles
Honduras and the United States to take action necessary to com-
ply with their international obligations concerning peace and
security, as well as those actions essential to maintain their
national security.42 Additionally, this article permits the Parties
to prescribe formalities in connection with covered investments,
provided the formalities do not impair any right granted in the
treaty. 3
Article XV addresses the extension of treaty obligations to the
political subdivisions of the Parties44 and to state enterprises.45
The duration of the agreement and its application to investments
in existence at the time the treaty became effective and those sub-
sequently established or acquired is set forth in Article XVI.4
The Annex and the Protocol are "integral" parts of the treaty,
but are not found within the articles in the main body of the BIT.47
The Annex sets forth those sectors of the economies and activities
of the United States and Honduras that the Parties have agreed
that they may exempt from the Article II obligation of extending
national treatment, and national and most favored nation treat-
ment. 8 The Protocol confirms the mutual understanding of the
Parties regarding specific aspects of the treaty.49
Preamble
The Preamble to the United States - Honduras treaty follows
40. See id. art. XII.
41. See id. art. XIII.
42. See id. art. XIV(1) and Protocol paras. (3) and (4) (confirming the
understanding of the Parties with respect to the meaning of Article XIV(1)).
43. See id. art. XIV(2).
44. See id. art. XV(1)(a) and (b).
45. See id. art. XV(2).
46. See id. art. XVI.
47. Id. art. XVI(4).
48. See id. Annex.
49. See id. Protocol; Jose Luis Siqueiros, Bilateral Treaties on the Reciprocal
Protection of Foreign Investment, 24 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 255, 258 (1994); See generally
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31 (4) [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (stating that special
meaning shall be given to terms when the parties to treaties so intended); See also
EDMUND JAN OsMANCzYs, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND




the title and precedes the aiticles.5° It consists of five statements
that outline the object and purpose of the Parties." The treaty
does not expressly state the purpose of the Preamble. The con-
cluding phrase of the Preamble that the Parties "Have agreed as
follows:" immediately precedes the articles of the treaty, confirm-
ing that it is not part of the substantive body of legal principles
that constitute the treaty.52 This determination is supported by a
reading of the Annex and the Protocol that are stated to
"form... integral part [s]" of the treaty. 3 A statement in the treaty
concerning the intent of the Parties for including the Preamble
and the purposes of the statements in the Preamble would have
eliminated uncertainty concerning its significance.
Although the Preamble is not part of the substantive aspect of
the agreement, its inclusion and placement in the final document
establishes that the Parties considered it relevant to achieving the
goals sought in the BIT. The articles, Annex and Protocol should
be understood and interpreted with reference to the prefactory
statements in the Preamble.5
The Preamble commences with the statement that the United
States and Honduras enter into the treaty "[d]esiring to promote
greater economic cooperation between them, with respect to
investment by nationals and companies of one Party in the terri-
tory of the other Party." 5 It concludes by stating that the Parties,
"[hiaving resolved to conclude a treaty concerning the encourage-
ment and reciprocal protection of investment;. . .[have agreed as
follows:. ... ".6 Since the precise purpose of the Preamble is left to
interpretation, an arbitral panel could conclude that the capital
exporting state has an affirmative duty to "promote economic
cooperation" by "encouraging" foreign investment. 7 A reasonable
50. See id. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, Preamble;
See generally U. N. CTR. ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/65, U.N. Sales No. E.88.II.A.1 at 14-15, (1988)
[hereinafter U.N. Ctr. on Transnational Corporations, Bilateral Investment Treaties].
51. See generally Albright, supra note 26; SoRNAiAJH, supra note 2, at 237;
Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, supra note 1, at 8; Vienna Convention,
supra note 49, art. 31.
52. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, Preamble.
53. Id. art. XVI(4).
54. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 237; Siqueiros, supra note 49, at 258-59; See
generally IIMAR TAMMELO, TREATY INTERPRETATION AND PRACTICAL REASON-
TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 11, 12 (1967) (stating that
treaty interpretation requires "consideration of the whole context of the treaty").
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interpretation suggests that neither the United States nor Hondu-
ras should impede the flow of investment into or out of their
respective countries.- During times of discord between the Par-
ties arguments alleging a breach of the treaty will likely rely on
the language of the Preamble."
The second goal announced in the Preamble recognizes "that
agreement upon the treatment to be accorded such investment
will stimulate the flow of private capital and the economic devel-
opment of the Parties."" This goal reflects the view that private
foreign investment is a component of economic development"1 and
that intergovernmental agreements establishing standards of
treatment and protection for foreign investment encourage the
flow of direct investment.2 Investment protections extended by
international agreement provide more security to an investor than
the Parties' domestic laws, which are subject to judicial interpre-
tation and unilateral modification.
The third aim recognized in the preamble is that "a stable
framework for investment will maximize effective utilization of
economic resources and improve living standards."' This pro-
nouncement fosters the belief that the treaty will prove mutually
beneficial to the economic development of both Honduras and the
United States.6" It presupposes that the private sector, as opposed
to government-directed decision-making results in the more effi-
cient use of limited resources.
The fourth objective announced in the Preamble is the recog-
nition that "the development of economic and business ties can
promote respect for internationally recognized worker rights."'
The goal is not the direct promotion of American or Honduran
labor rights, but rather the indication of a belief that economic
development "can promote respect" for "internationally recognized
58. See SoRm.ARAiAH, supra note 2, at 239.
59. See id. at 238-39.
60. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, Preamble.
61. See Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony at the Central American Summit in
San Jose, Costa Rica, 33 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 673, 684 (May 8, 1997); Alejandro
A. Escobar, Introductory Note on Bilateral Investment Treaties Recently Concluded by
Latin American States, 11 ICSID REVIEW- FOREIGN INv. L. J. 86, 87 (1996).
62. Cf SORNAA.JAH, supra note 2, at 236 (stating that developing countries believe
that investor confidence in the legal structure will attract foreign direct investment,
but the ability to attract FDI depends more on the political and economic climate).
63. See Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, supra note 1, preface iii.
64. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, Preamble.
65. See SORNAPAJAH, supra note 2, at 239.




The final purpose of the Preamble expresses the conviction of
the Parties that the preceding "objectives can be achieved without
relaxing health, safety and environmental measures of general
application."" This element of the Preamble differs from the rec-
ognition of worker rights in a significant regard. The focus on
worker rights is from the international perspective. The attention
directed to health, safety and environmental measures only con-
cerns those of "general application," a phrase that is not defined.
69
The dual purposes of this objective is to dissuade the Parties from
reducing health, safety and environmental standards to obtain
investment, while at the same time recognizing the sovereignty of
the United States and Honduras in matters of public health,
safety and the environment.
Scope of Application
Scope of Application: Investment
The United States - Honduras investment agreement applies
to "investment[s]" as defined in Article I (d) of the treaty.7" One of
the initial ambiguities in the treaty is that Article I (d) defines
"investment" to mean "every kind of investment."7 1 The meaning
of "investment" in the phrase "every kind of investment" is not,
however, defined. 2 The objects, that is the "investment," to which
the United States and Honduras afford specific rights and protec-
tions can only be determined by interpreting Article I (d).
An examination of Article I (d) results in the conclusion that
67. Id. See generally Kimberly Ann Elliott, International Labor Standards and
Trade: What Should be Done?, in LAUNCHING NEW GLOBAL TRADE TALKS, AN ACTION
AGENDA, at 165, 167 (Inst. Int'l Econ., Jeffery J. Schott ed. 1998) (The International
Labor Organization core standards are: freedom of association; collective bargaining;
freedom from forced labor; equal remuneration; nondiscrimination in employment;
and a minumum age for work. These principles are also endorsed by Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development Trade Union Advisory Committee and the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.).
68. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, Preamble.
69. Id.
70. Id. art. I(d); See generally McGhie, supra note 11, at 110 (discussing treaty
definitions of "investment" and "investor"); MARYSE ROBERT, ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES, MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL INVESTMENT RULES: WHAT COMES
NEXT? 3-5 (2001) (analyzing the scope of investment agreements in the Western
Hemisphere).
71. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. I(d); see
generally U.N. Ctr. On Transnational Corporations, Bilateral Investment Treaties,
supra note 50, at 16-18.
72. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. I(d).
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the term "investment" should be broadly construed.73 The defini-
tion states that "investment" includes "every kind of investment"
and that "every kind of investment.. .includes investment consist-
ing or taking the form of' any or all of six categories of juridical
entities, legal rights and assets.7" The definition was drafted in
terms that would encompass new, yet undeveloped forms of
investment.76
The types of juridical entities, legal rights and assets that
may constitute an investment are broad and illustrative.7 The
first is a "company."' A "company", comprehensively defined in
Article I (a), includes "any entity constituted or organized under
applicable law, whether or not for profit, and whether privately or
governmentally owned or controlled."79 The term "company" is not
limited to incorporated juridical entities, but "includes a corpora-
tion, trust, partnership, sole proprietorship, branch, joint venture,
association or other organization." 0 "Shares, stock, and other
forms of equity participation, and bonds, debentures, and other
forms of debt interests in a company" form the second type of
investments."'
Contractual rights, tangible and intangible property, and
rights acquired pursuant to law comprise the third, fourth and
sixth types of investments. Contractual rights are expansively
defined to include rights "such as under turnkey, construction or
management contracts, production or revenue-sharing contracts,
concessions, or other similar contracts." 3 Tangible and intangible
property includes "real property" and "rights, such as leases, mort-
gages, liens and pledges."' "Rights conferred pursuant to law,"
the sixth form of investment, embraces rights "such as licenses
and permits." 5
73. See ROBERT, supra note 70, at 4; Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991,
supra note 1, at 8; See also COMEAUX, supra note 14, at 105 (stating that the United
States prototype treaty language is broad).
74. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. I(d).
75. Id.
76. See SORNARtAJAt, supra note 2, at 241; Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-
1991, supra note 1, at 8.
77. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. I(d).
78. Id. art. I(d)(i).
79. Id. art. I(a).
80. Id.
81. Id. art. I(d)(ii).
82. See id. art. I(d)(iii), (iv) and (vi).
83. See id. art. I(d)(iii).
84. Id. art. I(d)(iv).
85. Id. art. I(d)(vi).
438
US-HONDURAS BIT
The fifth and one of the most important forms of investment
protected by the United States - Honduras BIT is "intellectual
property."" The BIT lacks a specific definition of intellectual
property, but provides a list of those rights that the Parties
deemed to be intellectual property rights. Intellectual property
includes "copyrights and related rights, patents, rights in plant
varieties, industrial designs, rights in semiconductor layout
designs, trade secrets, including know-how and confidential busi-
ness information, trade and service marks, and trade names. "s'
Scope of Application: Parameters on Investment
Although "investment" is broadly defined in Article I (d), the
treaty includes specific limitations on investments and restric-
tions on to whom those benefits may flow." The principal restric-
tions focus on the nationality of natural-person investors, the
place of organization of a juridical person investment, territorial-
ity constraints and the preclusion of treaty benefits under specifi-
cally delineated, policy-based circumstances. The restrictions
mandate that the investment be one of a "national or company" of
either the United States or Honduras and that it be "owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by that national or company."89
The investment must be in the territory of the other Party" and
the extension of treaty benefits may not inure to a third country
with whom a Party does not maintain normal economic relations
or to a juridical entity essentially conducting business in the terri-
tory of one of the Parties in name only."
Nationals
A "national" of a Party is a "natural person" according to the
"applicable law" of the respective Party.2 The term "applicable
law" is not defined nor is there customary international law that
addresses this issue. 3 "Applicable law" should be understood to
86. Id. art. I(d)(v).
87. Id.
88. See generally McGhie, supra note 11, at 111 (discussing limitations on the
term "investment").
89. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. 1(d).
90. See id. art. I(e).
91. See id. art. XII(a) and (b).
92. Id. art. I(c); see generally U. N. Ctr. On Transnational Corporations, Bilateral
Investment Treaties, supra note 50, at 22-23.
93. See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, INT'L CTR. FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF
INV. DISPUTES, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 35 (1995)
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mean the respective domestic laws of Honduras and the United
States .9
The treaty does not address two issues concerning who should
be considered a "national." Those issues include the impact of a
change of nationality by an individual subsequent to the estab-
lishment or acquisition of an investment 95 and by a natural person
of one Party who is a long-term resident of the other Party in
whose territory the investment exists.
9 6
These issues may be resolved by resorting to the Preamble.
The Preamble provides that one of the purposes of the treaty is
the promotion of greater economic integration with respect to
investment "by nationals... of one Party in the territory of the
other Party." 7 Considering this purpose, permitting a natural
person to change nationality with the intent of altering entitle-
ment to treaty benefits would defeat the purpose of fostering eco-
nomic cooperation through investment in the territory of the other
Party. Extending the privileges of the BIT to a person who is a
long-term resident of the host state, but a national of the other
Party, would also have this effect. The treaty does, however, state
that the "applicable law" of the Parties resolves questions of
nationality, indicating that the intent of natural-person investors
in asserting a particular nationality is significant.9"
Juridical Entities
A "company," as previously stated, includes a broad array of
juridical entities constituted or organized "under applicable law."99
The term includes "any entity... whether or not for profit, and
whether privately or governmentally owned or controlled, and
includes a corporation, trust, partnership, sole proprietorship,
branch, joint venture, association, or other organization."10 The
treaty definition, by referencing "any entity" and concluding with
the phrase "or other organization," encompasses a multitude of
legal persons currently known or that may be developed in the
future.
The United States - Honduras BIT employs a place of incor-
poration test and defines a "company of a Party" as a juridical
94. See Escobar, supra note 61, at 88.
95. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 36.
96. See Escobar, supra note 61, at 88.
97. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, Preamble.
98. Id. art. l(c).




entity "constituted or organized under the laws of that Party."''
Ambiguity in the BIT exists because juridical entities in the
United States are constituted or organized under the laws of sub-
federal authorities, rather than federal law. However, sub-federal
authorities are not "Parties" to the treaty.
The definition of "company of a Party"' ° should be interpreted
to include those juridical entities constituted or organized under
the laws of the sub-federal authorities of the United States or
Honduras. A "company," in accordance with the definition in Arti-
cle I (a), is any entity constituted or organized under "applicable
law."0  Applicable law in Honduras and the United States should
mean the laws of the jurisdictions providing for the establishment
and governance ofjuridical entities. A restrictive interpretation of
Article I (b) would essentially render the agreement void."°
Territoriality Requirement
The territoriality requirement of an investment is set forth in
Article I (e). Article I (e) defines an investment to which the bene-
fits of the treaty may flow as a "covered investment."'0 ' A "covered
investment" is further defined as "an investment of a national or
company of a Party in the territory of the other Party."106 The
treaty does not, however, delineate the "territory" of either the
United States or Honduras. The territories of both countries
should be those areas over which the Parties exercised sovereign
authority on July 1, 1995, the date of the signing of the treaty.
Providing investments in subsequently acquired territory with the
benefits of the treaty should not be assumed. Territorial additions
by either Party could result in circumstances not contemplated
during the negotiations.0 7
Denial of Treaty Benefits
Investments that meet the nationality, juridical entity and
territoriality requirements may still be denied the benefits of the
101. Id. art. I(b); See ROBERT, supra note 70, at 4.
102. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. I(b).
103. Id. art. 1(a).
104. See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 49, art. 31(1) (treaties should be
interpreted in good faith and in light of their object and purpose).
105. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. I(e).
106. Id.; see U.N. Ctr. on Transnational Corporations, Bilateral Investment
Treaties, supra note 50, at 26.
107. See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 49, art. 62 (addressing
unforeseen, fundamental changes in circumstances).
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treaty under circumstances set forth in Article XII.05 Article XII
"reserves" to the United States and Honduras the right to deny "a
company of the other Party the benefits of this treaty if nationals
of a third country own or control the company" and one of two
other circumstances exist."9 The initial situation involves the
denial of treaty benefits to an investment owned or controlled by
nationals of a country that the United States or Honduras, which-
ever state is denying the benefits, "does not maintain normal eco-
nomic relations.""' Article XII (a) respects the rights of the
Parties to choose those third states with which they will engage
economically. The United States, in accordance with this provi-
sion, may not be compelled to extend treaty benefits to an entity
that meets the definition of a "company of a Party," but is owned
or controlled, for instance, by nationals of North Korea, Burma
(Myanmar) or Cuba."' Honduras, likewise, retains the right,
based on the policy considerations enunciated in Article XII (a), to
limit those juridical entities that may enjoy the privileges of the
treaty.
The second circumstance ensures the Parties the right to
withhold treaty benefits from any entity that 'has no substantial
business activities in the territory of the Party under whose laws
it is constituted or organized."" 2 This reservation, set forth in
Article XII (b), is drafted to preserve the flow of treaty benefits to
the Parties. Whether the business activity in issue is "substan-
tial" is a matter resolved on a case-by-case basis. Business activ-
ity should be considered "substantial" if it supports the economic
development of the host Party 11 and promotes the underlying pur-
pose of precluding name-only entities with few ties to the state of
organization from enjoying the benefits of the treaty. The
recourse of an entity denied treaty benefits, because it lacks sub-
stantial business activity in the state under whose laws it is con-
108. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 42.
109. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. XII; see U. N.
Ctr. On Transnational Corporations, Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 50, at
25.
110. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. XII(a); See
ROBERT, supra note 70, at 5.
111. See generally OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
SANCTIONS PROGRAM AND COUNTRY SUMMARIES, at www.treas.gov/offices/
enforcement/ofac/sanctions/index.html.
112. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. XII(b); See
ROBERT, supra note 70, at 5.




stituted, is to seek the benefits of a BIT negotiated with the state
where it undertakes substantial business activity, if a BIT with
that state exists.
Scope of Application: Time
The temporal application of the United States - Honduras
BIT is addressed in Article XVI. Article XVI addresses when the
agreement becomes effective, establishes a minimum duration,
the method of its termination, and the effect of treaty terms and
conditions subsequent to termination of the agreement.
Entry into Force and Duration
The treaty entered into force pursuant to Article XVI (1) on
July 11, 2001, thirty days after the Parties exchanged instru-
ments of ratification. 114 It remains in force for a minimum of ten
years and could conceivably continue to be lex specialis between
the two countries indefinitely."5 The treaty may be terminated in
accordance with Article XVI (2) only after its initial ten-year
period and then only after the Party electing to end the agreement
provides the other with written notice. If neither Party chooses to
conclude the agreement at the end of the initial ten-year period, it
may be terminated at any subsequent time provided the terminat-
ing Party gives the other Party "one year's written notice.""'
An issue of concern for investors is the effect of premature
termination of the agreement. 7 A subsequent government of a
Party that does not share the same political ideology or economic
policy of the ratifying government might assert that it is not
bound by the treaty. The only possible assertion in this situation,
which would likely prove unsuccessful in the context of the United
States - Honduras BIT, would be an unforeseen, fundamental
change of circumstances pursuant to Article 62 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of International Treaties (Vienna Conven-
tion). ' Circumstances sufficient to justify termination of the
agreement contrary to Article XVI would entail a "change that
radically transforms the obligation under the treaty.""9 A change
114. See id. at art. XVI(1); See generally DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 44
(discussing the entry into force and duration of BIT's).
115. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. XVI(1);
See generally COMEAUX, supra note 14, at 109.
116. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. XVI(2).
117. See SORNARAAH, supra note 2, at 274.
118. See Vienna Convention, supra note 49, art. 62.
119. Id.
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of government or economic policy, even if through revolution, does
not constitute the fundamental change contemplated by the
Vienna Convention. 20 This argument would be more persuasive if
the governments of Honduras and the United States were not rep-
resentative governments.21'
Application of the Treaty to Existing and Subsequent
Investments
Article XVI (1) provides that the treaty applies to "covered
investments... existing at the time of entry into force," as well as,
those that are established or acquired after the inception of the
agreement. 2 This provision, representative of a practice in many
Latin American BIT's,"' extends the protections of the agreement
to those investments that predate the treaty, as well as, those ini-
tiated or acquired after its effective date.2 4 Absent the provision
expressly providing coverage for prior investments, the only pro-
tection available for those investments would be the limited pro-
tections afforded under customary international law.
Effect of the Treaty After Termination
Although the BIT has specific provisions addressing its termi-
nation, some obligations survive termination. Article XVI (3) pro-
vides that all of the terms and conditions of the agreement, except
those pertaining to the establishment or acquisition of an invest-
ment, continue in force for ten years after the conclusion of the
treaty.
12'
Ambiguity in Article XVI (3) and (4) establishes a basis for
maintaining a right to eleven years of treaty protection. Article
XVI (3) provides that the treaty protections continue for ten years
after its termination."6 Article XVI (2) states that the agreement
120. See SORNARAjAH, supra note 2, at 274-275.
121. See id.
122. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. XVI (1); See
generally COMEAUX, supra note 14, at 109; ROBERT, supra note 70, at 5 (stating that
most investment agreements in the Western Hemisphere afford protection for
investments made before and after the entry into force of the particular treaty).
123. See Escobar, supra note 61, at 88.
124. See ROBERT, supra note 70, at 50; Siqueiros, supra note 49, at 267; see
generally U. N. Ctr. On Transnational Corporations, Bilateral Investment Treaties,
supra note 50, at 21-22.
125. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. XVI(3);
see generally U. N. Ctr. On Transnational Corporations, Bilateral Investment
Treaties, supra note 50, at 28.
126. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. XVI(3).
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terminates at the end of the initial ten year period or anytime
thereafter on giving one year's written notice. 127 If the treaty does
not terminate until one of the Parties gives one year's written
notice and the benefits continue for ten years subsequent to its
termination, an investor may claim entitlement to eleven years of
protection. Article XVI should be interpreted as terminating the
treaty on the date of written notification, thereafter extending
only ten years of protection. This interpretation is not in explicit
accord with the language of the agreement but it is in concurrence
with the presumed intent of the Parties.
Admission
Establishment and Acquisition
Customary international law, as reflected in the Guidelines
on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment developed by the
World Bank Group ("World Bank Guidelines")'28 and the United
Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,'29 is
well-settled concerning the obligation of states to permit foreign
investment in their territories.3 " The decision to admit foreign
investment is a matter of governmental policy and the discretion
to exercise that policy rests exclusively with the state concerned. 3 '
The execution of an investment treaty is an assertion of sovereign
discretion whereby a state relinquishes its absolute right to con-
trol the entry of foreign investment.'32
In many investment treaties, admission clauses provide that
the entry of foreign investment "shall" be permitted.133 The enti-
tlement to enter the territory of the host state for the purpose of
establishing or acquiring foreign direct investment is, however,
127. See id. at art. XVI(2).
128. See THE WORLD BANK GROUP, Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct
Investment, 7 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INV. L. J., 297, 299 (1992) [hereinafter World
Bank Guidelines].
129. See CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES G.A. Res. 3281, U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. doc. A/RES/3281 (XXIX) (1975) (hereinafter U.N. Charter of
Economic Rights].
130. See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Recent Trends Relating to Entry of Foreign Direct
Investment, 9 ICSID Review- Foreign Inv. L. J. 47, 59 (1994); A.A.Fatouros, Towards
an International Agreement on Foreign Direct Investment?, 10 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN
INv. L.J. 181 (1995).
131. See Shihata, supra note 130, at 47; Adeoye Akinsanya, International
Protection of Direct Foreign Investment in the Third World, INT'L & COMP L. Q. 58, 59
(1987); McGhie, supra note 11, at 112.
132. See Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, supra note 1, at 9.
133. See Shihata, supra note 130, at 55.
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generally qualified by language that only authorizes admission in
accordance with the host state's domestic laws and regulations.3
Treaty provisions that provide for the admission of foreign invest-
ment subject to the host state's laws and regulations, which are
subject to domestic interpretation and amendment, in practice sig-
nificantly restrict the ability of a foreign investor to establish or
acquire investment."5
The practice of the United States, continued in the United
States - Honduras investment treaty, is considerably different. 36
The United States - Honduras BIT does not have a separate arti-
cle or clause addressing the admission of foreign investment."7
The approach taken by the United States, designed to reduce the
actions of foreign governments that impede or distort the flow of
investment, is a system based on national treatment and most
favored nation principles. 3 ' The aim of United States BIT prac-
tice is to enable investment decisions to respond to market
forces .139
Article 11 (1) of the United States - Honduras treaty estab-
lishes a liberal policy favoring the admission of investments of
nationals and juridical entities of the other Party. The United
States and Honduras agree to accord the establishment and acqui-
sition of covered investments national treatment, most favored
nation treat or the more favorable of national treatment and most
favorable nation treatment.4 ' National treatment is the treat-
ment of foreign investment "no less favorable than [the Party]
accords, in like situations, to investments in its territory of its own
nationals or companies."' Most favored nation treatment
involves a comparison of the treatment accorded investments
made by nationals and juridical entities of the other Party with
the treatment accorded by the host Party to investments in its ter-
ritory by nationals and juridical entities of third countries.' The
unavoidable ambiguity in the definition of national treatment and
134. See id.; see also Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, supra note 1, at 8.
135. See Shihata, supra note 130, at 55; Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991,
supra note 1, at 8.
136. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 50.
137. See id. at 56; Fatouros, supra note 130, at 195.
138. See McGhie, supra note 11, at 113.
139. See Shihata, supra note 130, at 55; Statement by the President, International
Investment Policy, 19 WKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1214 (Sept. 9, 1983) [hereinafter
Presidential Investment Policy Statement].
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most favored nation treatment is the comparison of "like
situations."1 "
The dictates of Article II(2)(a) and the Annex curtail the lib-
eral admission policy set forth in Article II(1). Article II (2)(a) pro-
vides that Honduras and the United States may "adopt or
maintain" exceptions to their national treatment, most favored
nation treatment or their national and most favored nation treat-
ment obligations "in the sectors or with respect to the matters
specified in the Annex."1 44 Article II (2)(a) afforded both Parties,
at the time the treaty was negotiated, the right to make specific
reservations that they determined to be in their national security
interest or that were consistent with their economic goals.'45
The system utilized in the United States - Honduras agree-
ment is that of a "negative list" intended to foster transparency.'46
The Parties were obligated to stipulate in the Annex those sectors
or matters for which they may withhold the agreement's open
admission policy.' Accepting the premise that the treaty's policy
is one of open admission, exceptions should not be implied and
those declared in the Annex should be narrowly construed, in
accord with the intent and purpose of the exception privilege of
Article II."4
Performance Requirements
Performance requirements are obligations imposed by host
states on investors, frequently in conjunction with an incentive,
that mandate the investing national or entity operate the invest-
ment in a particular manner.'49 These requirements may be a pre-
requisite to establishing or acquiring an investment or an
obligation imposed to continue its operation. Performance
requirements can be used to discriminate against foreign inves-
tors if, for example, they compel a minimum amount of production
be exported or that the investor purchase a minimum amount of
143. Id.
144. Id. art. II(2)(a); see infra Sector and Subject Specific Exceptions to National
Treatment and Most Favored Nation Treatment Obligations.
145. See Shihata, supra note 130, at 68.
146. See id. at 58; FOREIGN INv. ADVISORY SERV., INT'L FIN. CORP., FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT, LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE NUMBER 5, at 30 (1997) [hereinafter FOREIGN
INVESTMENT ADVISORY SERVICE].
147. See Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, supra note 1, at 8.
148. See Vienna Convention, supra note 49, art. 31(1).
149. See Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, supra note 1, at 10; see generally
ROBERT, supra note 70, at 7-8 (addressing performance requirements in BIT's and
trade agreements in countries of the Western Hemisphere).
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locally produced goods or services. 5 '
United States BIT practice, contrary to most investment
treaty practice, expressly addresses performance requirements."'
Article VI of the United States - Honduras treaty provides that
neither country "shall mandate or enforce" performance require-
ments as a prerequisite for the "establishment, acquisition, expan-
sion, management, conduct or operation of a covered
investment.""2 Neither Party, pursuant to Article VI, may compel
an investor to utilize host country products or services, limit
imports, export a specific measure of products or services, limit
sales within the host Party's territory, transfer technology, pro-
duction processes or other propriety knowledge or engage in
research and development."3 The prohibition against perform-
ance requirements extends to "any commitment or undertaking in
connection with the receipt of a governmental permission or
authorization," however "conditions for the receipt or continued
receipt of an advantage" are specifically authorized.' Arbitral
tribunals relying on Article VI and the national treatment stan-
dard of Article II, should question conditions imposed subsequent
to the entry of an investment. 5- The enactment of legislation that
is facially neutral, but impacts domestic and foreign investment in
different degrees is the concern of the foreign investor.
General Standards of Treatment
Treatment standards in bilateral investment treaties enable
the Parties to eliminate or reduce the uncertainty that exists in
customary international law concerning the rights and privileges
accorded to foreign investment within the territories of their
respective BIT partners.'56 Treatment standards may be catego-
rized into absolute standards and relative standards.'57 Absolute
standards include fair and equitable treatment, full protection
and security, and treatment according to the minimum standards
150. See Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, supra note 1, at 10; see generally
ROBERT, supra note 70, at 7-8.; DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 79.
151. See Presidential Investment Policy Statement, supra note 139, at 1216;
DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 80.
152. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. VI; see
Patricia McKinstry Robin, The BIT Won't Bite: The American Bilateral Investment
Treaty Program, 33 Am. U. L. REV 931, 949 (1984).
153. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. VI(a) - (f).
154. Id. art. VI; See Shihata, supra note 130, at 59.
155. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 251.
156. See id. at 250.
157. See COMEAUX, supra note 14, at 105-06.
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of international law.1 ' The relative standards of treatment
include national treatment and most favored nation treatment. 15 9
The lack of an international consensus concerning the treat-
ment that must be accorded foreign investment is reflected in the
manner the treatment standards are set forth in BIT's. 60 Treat-
ment standards are not uniform and the format of the standards
in BIT's reflects the unique views of the contracting parties
regarding the relationship between the different standards.'
The United States - Honduras BIT addresses the Parties'
treatment obligations in a single article. Article II mandates that
each Party accord covered investments national treatment, most
favorable nation treatment, or national and most favored nation
treatment "[with respect to the establishment, acquisition,
expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other dis-
position of covered investments."162 National treatment, as previ-
ously discussed, is the treatment of foreign investment no less
favorable than a Party accords to investment in its territory by its
own nationals or juridical entities. 6 ' Most favored nation treat-
ment, also addressed earlier, is the treatment of covered foreign
investments in a manner no less favorable than a Party accords to
investments in its territory by nationals and entities of third coun-
tries."' National and most favored nation treatment extends to
covered investments the more favorable of either national treat-
ment or most favored nation treatment.
65
Fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security,
and treatment no less favorable than that required by interna-
tional law are additional treatment standards set forth in the
United States - Honduras agreement." These principles, like
national treatment, most favored nation treatment and the better
of national and most favored nation treatment, while provided for
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See Escobar, supra note 61, at 89.
161. See id.
162. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. II(1).
163. See id.; See generally ROBERT, supra note 70, at 5 (discussing the concept of
national treatment in countries of the Western Hemisphere).
164. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. II(1); See
generally ROBERT, supra note 70, at 6-7 (discussing the concept of most favored nation
treatment in countries of the Western Hemisphere).
165. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. II(1).
166. See id. art. 11(3); See generally ROBERT, supra note 70, at (discussing treatment
standards in countries of the Western Hemisphere).
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in Article II, are set forth in a subsequent separate clause." 7
Unlike the obligations of national treatment, most favored nation
treatment, and national and most favored nation treatment to
which Honduras and the United States can adopt and maintain
exceptions, 8 the Parties bound themselves "at all times" to accord
fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, and
treatment no less favorable than customary international law
mandates.16 9 The relationship between the treatment standards
in Article 11 (1) and those in paragraph (3) is not set forth in the
language of the treaty. Using the interpretative rules set forth in
the Vienna Convention suggests reading both paragraphs
together and understanding the text in a manner that affords
each meaning, 170 with the more favorable interpretation to the
advantage of the investor.
The manner in which the United States - Honduras treaty
was drafted indicates that the obligations of national treatment,
most favored nation treatment, and national and most favored
nation treatment apply to a specific, limited schedule of activities,
namely "the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of covered invest-
ments."171 The obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment,
full protection and security, and treatment no less favorable than
mandated by international law are not limited by any treaty lan-
guage and apply to all investment-related relationships between
an investor and the host state.
Fair and Equitable Treatment
The United States - Honduras BIT provides that the Parties
shall at all times accord "fair and equitable treatment" to covered
investments, but does not define the meaning of "fair and equita-
ble treatment."'7 2 The phrase is both vague and subject to inter-
pretation.173 Although there is no international consensus of "fair
and equitable" treatment, the purpose of the clause is to "provide
a basic and general standard" that is detached from the host
167. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. 11(3).
168. See id. art. I(2).
169. See id.
170. See Vienna Convention supra note 49, art. 31.
171. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. II(1).
172. See generally DOLzER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 60; U. N. Ctr. On
Transnational Corporations, Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 50, at 30.
173. See SORNARAJ.AH, supra note 2, at 250-251; Bilateral Investment Treaties
1959-1991, supra note 1, at 9.
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state's domestic laws.174 Assessing what parties with different
perspectives consider to be "fair and equitable" will be difficult,
but this standard affords the treaty the flexibility to apply in a
multitude of circumstances.
"Fair and equitable" treatment, as set forth in the treaty, is
an independent standard of treatment.'75 The phrase "fair and
equitable treatment" is separated from the phrase "full protection
and security" by a conjunctive,'76 as is the third phrase of Article II
(3)(a) that concludes "and shall in no case accord treatment less
favorable than that required by international law."'77 The draft-
ing of Article II (3)(a) indicates three different standards: fair and
equitable treatment, full protection and security, and treatment
not below that mandated by customary international law. This
position is persuasive considering that the Parties agreed that
they "shall in no case accord treatment" below the standard
required by international law. 7 If the minimum standard is set
in accordance with international law, any additional investment
protection must grant covered investments greater sanctuary
from adverse host state measures.'79
The language of Article II (3)(a) may, conversely, be under-
stood as only affording that treatment accorded by international
law. The phrase "fair and equitable treatment and full protection
and security", under this interpretation is merely an articulation
of the minimum standard of treatment pursuant to international
law. Some Latin American treaties provide that "fair and equita-
ble treatment" shall be "in accordance with or in conformity with
the rules and principles of international law", 8 ° indicating a belief
that international law mandates fair and equitable treatment for
foreign investments.
Fair and equitable treatment, as well as full protection and
security, in the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA),181 is explicitly subsumed under the minimum standard
174. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 58; see ROBERT, supra note 70, at 4.
175. See generally Shihata, supra note 130, at 56; Cf ROBERT, supra note 70, at 4-5.
176. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. II(3)(a).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See generally DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 60; see also F.A. Mann,
British Treaties for the Protection and Promotion of Investment, 1981 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 244 (stating that "fair and equitable treatment" goes beyond the minimum
standard of international law and should be understood and applied autonomously).
180. See Escobar, supra note 61, at 89.
181. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 107
Stat. 2057, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
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of customary international law.182 Article 1105(1) of the NAFTA
provides that "[el party shall accord to investments of investors of
another party treatment in accordance with international law,
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security.""3 The language in Chapter 11 of the NAFTA is, how-
ever, significantly different from the phraseology employed in the
United States - Honduras BIT. More host state obligations
emerge from a plain reading of the United States - Honduras
agreement than from the NAFTA.
Whether Article II (3)(a) of the treaty is merely an elaboration
of the minimum standards of treatment required by international
law or affords greater investment protections is significant
because of the rigors encountered to confirm the existence of a cus-
tomary international legal standard.184 Validating the existence of
an international legal precept is arduous.,' This exercise is
avoided if it is concluded that the Parties to the treaty intended
that protections greater than those available under international
were undertaken with the execution of the agreement.
Full Protection and Security
The United States and Honduras agreed in Article II to
accord, at all times, "full protection and security."""8 This obliga-
tion, similar to the obligation of fair and equitable treatment,
lacks definition and exactitude.' Whether the obligation to
accord "full protection and security" is an independent duty of the
host state or simply part of the minimum standard of treatment
subsumed by customary international law also remains
unsettled.'
The duty of providing "full protection and security" extends
from the Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, trea-
ties for which the focus was not foreign direct investment. 9 The
FCN obligation of "full protection and security" is a general duty
on the part of the host state to exercise "due diligence" in the pro-
182. See Free Trade Commission Clarifications Related to NAFTA Chapter 11, July
31, 2001, at B.
183. NAFTA, supra note 181, art. 1105(1).
184. See generally PARRY, supra note 3, at 81-82.
185. See id.
186. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, at art. II(3)(a); see
ROBERT, supra note 70, at 6.
187. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 60-61.
188. Cf. BARCELONA TRACTION 1970 ICJ 32 (full protection and security held to be a
"self-contained" standard of treatment).
189. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 60-61.
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tection of foreigners.19 The obligation does not establish a strict
liability standard that would render host states responsible for
any detrimental change in investment circumstances or destruc-
tion of an investment. 9' Early twentieth century scholars advo-
cated state responsibility for injuries caused to the person of an
alien, for the destruction of property by forces of the state or that
resulted from the negligence of the host state in protecting the
alien or his property." Support for this position was not, how-
ever, universal.'93
The World Bank Guidelines offer an understanding of what
the United States and Honduras may have intended by "full pro-
tection and security."9 4 The Guidelines suggest that fulfillment of
this commitment entails extending protection and security to the
persons of investors, as well as to property rights, including the
granting of permits, import and export licenses, employment
authorizations, entry and stay visas, and other legal matters rele-
vant to the treatment of foreign investors.' The Guidelines rec-
ognize that as foreign investment becomes more complex, so too
must the protections afforded investment.
International Law
The United States and Honduras, pursuant to Article II
(3)(a), "shall in no case accord [foreign investment] treatment less
favorable than that required by international law."9 ' This clause
reiterates the principle of customary international law that once
the privilege of engaging in the economic activity of a foreign
country is extended by a state, investors are entitled to a certain
minimum standard of treatment.197 The minimum standard of
190. Id. at 61.
191. See id.
192. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 124-25.
193. See id.
194. See World Bank Guidelines, supra note 128, at 300; See generally Ibrahim F. I.
Shihata, Introductory Remarks, Report to the Development Committee on the Legal
Framework for the Treatment of Foreign Investment, WORLD BANK GROUp, LEGAL
TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: "THE WORLD BANK GUIDELINES," (1993)
[hereinafter Shihata, Introductory Remarks WORLD BANK GUIDELINES 1. Mr. Shihata
was Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank and the Secretary-
General of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.
195. See World Bank Guidelines, supra note 128, at 300.
196. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. II(3)(a); see
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating the "[i]nternational law is
part of our [U.S.] law").
197. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 128-29 n.137 (quoting A. Roth, The
Minimum Standard of International Law Applied to Aliens 185-86 (1949)).
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treatment in the United States - Honduras agreement is custom-
ary international law, those international rules of state conduct
the existence of which is confirmed by the "general and consistent
practice of States."lM Customary international law is followed out
of a "sense of legal obligation," as opposed to economic or political
compulsion.'99
The minimum standard of treatment, while a "floor" below
which the treatment of foreign investment should not fall,2"' is a
nebulous standard. A "credible case" may be made for minimum
standards protecting "life, liberty, and property" from state vio-
lence or state-sanctioned mob violence and the arbitrary dispos-
session by a dictator for private gain.20 These are, however, old
benchmarks. The issues, among others, that will challenge future
arbitral panels is whether international law protects investors
against "unjust" domestic court judgments,2"2 the "arbitrary" fail-
ure of states to take affirmative actions,"' and "unfair" interna-
tional competition." 4
National Treatment, Most Favored Nation Treatment and
National and Most Favored Nation Treatment
The United States - Honduras BIT accords covered invest-
ments, "in like situations," national treatment, most favored
nation treatment or the "most favorable" of national and most
favored nation treatment.2 5 The national treatment standard
gives rise to international responsibility if the host state discrimi-
nates between its own investors and foreign investors.2"0 The
presence of the national treatment obligation, in addition to Arti-
198. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW supra note 3, at § 102 (2).
199. Id.; see MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (1997).
200. In a NAFTA Arbitration Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, S.D. Myers,
Inc. (Claimant) and Government of Canada (Respondent) Partial Award, para. 263
(Nov. 13, 2002).
201. SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 129.
202. See Mondev International Ltd. v. The United States of America, Notice of
Arbitration, para. 135 et seq., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/ (Sept. 1, 1999).
203. See GAMI Investments, Inc. v. The Government of the United Mexican States,
Demand for Arbitration, (April 9, 2002).
204. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law: Customary International Law Does Not Protect Anticompetitive
Behavior 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 441 (2003).
205. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. II(1); See
generally McGhie, supra note 11, at 113-15 (discussing the national treatment and
most favored nation treatment standards).
206. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 251; ROBERT, supra note 70, at 6; U. N. Ctr.
On Transnational Corporations, Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 50, at 33.
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cle VI, impedes the host state from imposing burdens such as
export quotas or local purchase requirements on the foreign inves-
tor after the investment agreement has been executed." ' This is
significant, subsequent to the commitment of resources by the
investor, when the bargaining position of the host state will be
dominant.2"'
The most favored nation standard of treatment extends to
American or Honduran investors the most favorable treatment
that the Parties accord to third country investors. 209 A Honduran
investor in the United States, for example, is entitled to be treated
either in accordance with the standards of the United States -
Honduras BIT or in accordance with a more favorable measure if
such treatment is extended by the United States to an investor
from a third country with direct investment in the United
States.210 The treaty does not address whether the higher stan-
dard accorded a third country investor must be in accordance with
an investment treaty, leading to the conclusion that the only issue
of significance is the standard of treatment.
The United States - Honduras treaty, extending "national
treatment and most favored nation treatment," further obligates
the Parties to accord foreign investment the standard of treatment
that is the more favorable of the two.2 ' Although the foreign
investor should be entitled to the better standard of treatment,
even absent the express language of the treaty extending the
"most favorable," Article II (1) of the treaty eliminates any
doubt. 12
The principle burden facing an investor asserting that a Party
failed to accord national treatment, most favored nation treat-
ment or the most favorable of either national and most favored
nation treatment is the establishment of "like situations."21 The
207. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 251.
208. See id.
209. See id.; ROBERT, supra note 70, at 6; U. N. Ctr. On Transnational
Corporations, Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 50, at 34-35.
210. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 65-66.
211. See Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991 supra note 1, at 9; SORNARAJAH,
supra note 2, at 251.
212. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. 1(1).
213. Id. art. II(1); see generally Don Wallace, Jr. & David B. Bailey, The
Inevitability of National Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment With Increasingly
Few Excepions, 31 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 615, 620-21 (1998) (suggesting that the term
"like circumstances" employed in the proposed Multilateral Agreement on
Investments is a "modest norm" with its determination subject to different
application).
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investor must prove that the factual circumstances surrounding
the investment are "like" the situation involving an investment of
a national or juridical entity of the host state, in the case of
national treatment, or the situation involving the investment of a
third party investor, in the case of most favorable nation treat-
ment.214 Examining the totality of the circumstances, the inquiry
will scrutinize whether local investments or investments from a
third country, "in like situations," have been granted any special
privileges or benefits by the host state not available to the invest-
ment of an investor from the other Party.215 The inquiry should
seek to ascertain whether the foreign investment was placed at a
competitive disadvantage in relation to the situation of the domes-
tic or third country investments.2 16
Sector and Subject Specific Exceptions to National
Treatment and Most Favored Nation Treatment
Obligations
The United States and Honduras set forth exceptions to their
Article II (1) national treatment and most favored nation treat-
ment obligations in the treaty Annex."7 These exceptions are in
those sectors and matters in which the Parties domestic regimes
do not confer the investments of nationals or juridical entities of
the other Party national treatment or most favored nation treat-
ment."' The United States and Honduras must, even as regards
the excepted sectors and matters, afford covered investments all of
the other rights conferred in the agreement.21
The Annex specifies in paragraphs (1) and (4) the sectors and
matters for which the United States and Honduras may adopt or
maintain exceptions to their national treatment obligations.
2 0
Although the Parties have exempted themselves from the obliga-
tion of according national treatment in the listed sectors and sub-
jects, the agreement specifically mandates that they continue to
extend most favored nation treatment.2 1 The United States in
214. See Wallace & Bailey, supra note 213, at 619-20.
215. See Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, supra note 1, at 9.
216. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 66.
217. See Albright, supra note 26, at XIV; ROBERT, supra note 70, at 7.
218. See Albright, supra note 26, at XIV; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment
Liberalization and Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties,
36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 518 (1998).
219. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. XVI.
220. See id. Annex paras. (1) and (4).
221. See id. art. II(3)(a).
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paragraph (1) of the Annex exercised the right to adopt or main-
tain exceptions to its national treatment obligation in matters of:
atomic energy; customhouse brokers; licenses for broadcast,
common carriers, or aeronautical radio stations; COM-
CAST; subsidies or grants, including government-sup-
ported loans, guarantees and insurance; state and local
measures exempt from Article 1102 of the North American
Free Trade Agreement pursuant to Article 1108 thereof;
and landing of submarine cables.
22
Honduras in paragraph (4) exercised the right to adopt or main-
tain exceptions to its national treatment obligation in:
properties on cays, reefs, rocks, shoals or sandbanks or on
islands or on any property located within 40 km of the
coastline or land borders of Honduras; small scale industry
and commerce with total invested capital of no more than
US $40,000 or its equivalent in national currency; owner-
ship, operation and editorial control of broadcast radio and
television; ownership, operation and editorial control of
general interest periodicals and newspapers published in
Honduras.223
Although Honduras exercised its right to make exceptions to its
national treatment obligation, Protocol paragraph (2) confirms the
understanding that Honduras will neither reject nor delay deci-
sions on applications to possess or acquire real estate within
"urban zones" or in the areas enumerated in Annex paragraph (4)
"on grounds of nationality."224 Protocol paragraph (2) appears in
conflict with the language and intent of Annex paragraph (4).
The United States in paragraph (2) of the Annex reserved the
right to adopt or maintain exceptions to its obligation to accord
both national treatment and most favored nation treatment. The
United States reserved rights in "fisheries; air and marine trans-
port, and related activities."25 Honduras, however, reserved no
exceptions to its Article 11 (1) obligation to extend national treat-
ment and most favored nation treatment.
The United States advised Honduras during the treaty nego-
tiations that "if Honduras undertook acceptable commitments
with respect to all or certain financial services, the United States
would consider limiting its exceptions with respect to its national
222. Id. Annex, para. (1).
223. Id. Annex, para. (4).
224. Id. Protocol, para. (2).
225. Id. Annex para. (2).
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and MFN [most favored nation] treatment obligations in financial
services."226 Honduras responded by taking no exceptions relating
to banking, insurance, securities or other financial services.227
The United States, in Annex paragraph (3), further reserved in
"banking, insurance, securities, and other financial services,"228
the right to adopt or maintain exceptions to national treatment
and most favored nation treatment, but agreed to extend to Hon-
duran investments treatment no less favorable than that accorded
to Canada and Mexico in the NAFTA.229
Article II (2)(a) states that exceptions to the obligations of
Article II (1) may be "adopted or maintained" in the sectors or
with respect to the matters "specified" in the Annex. 3 ° While the
Parties may adopted or continue to maintain exceptions to the
treaty's Article 11 (1) obligations, neither the United States nor
Honduras may enlarge the enumeration of sectors or matters
excepted in the Annex. Those sectors and matters excepted from
the commitments to extend national treatment or most favored
nation treatment must have been set forth in the Annex at the
time the treaty was signed."' Expansion of the Annex to encom-
pass sectors or matters not provided for would be contrary to the
language of the treaty and violative of its transparency. Changes
to the Annex may only be by an amendment to the treaty ratified
by both Parties.
Article II (2)(a) of the treaty prohibits the application of an
exception that would require divestiture, in whole or in part, of a
covered investment that existed at the time the exception became
effective. 2 Protection of pre-establishment or pre-acquisition
activities is not afforded to investors as Article II (2)(a) only
addresses "covered investments existing at the time the exception
becomes effective."
2 3 3
Annex paragraph (5), unlike the preceding paragraphs, sets
forth a positive duty. Honduras and the United States in Annex
paragraph (5) agree to accord national treatment to covered
investments in the "leasing of minerals or pipeline rights-of-way
226. Albright, supra note 26, at XV.
227. See id.
228. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, para. (3).
229. See Albright, supra note 26, at XV.
230. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. II(2)(a).
231. See Shihata, supra note 130, at 57.
232. See Albright, supra note 26, at XVI; McGhie, supra note 11, at 113.
233. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. II (2)(a).
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on government lands."23 4 The United States sought the inclusion
of paragraph (5) because the Mineral Lands Leasing Act235 and
federal law pertaining to Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale
Reserves"' dictate that foreign investors must be denied mineral
leases, and oil and gas pipeline rights-of-way on government lands
in the United States if American foreign direct investors are
denied those right in a foreign country.237
Discriminatory Measures
The treatment obligations of Article II (3)(a), to accord fair
and equitable treatment, full protection and security, and treat-
ment not less than required by international law, are accompa-
nied by an additional obligation in Article II (3)(b). Article II (3)(b)
mandates that neither the United States nor Honduras "shall in
any way impair by unreasonable and discriminatory measures the
management, conduct, operation, and sale or disposition of cov-
ered investments."2 3 The obligation of nondiscriminatory treat-
ment applies to governmental "measures."3 9 The treaty does not
indicate whether the measures must involve direct governmental
action or more broadly encompass action only tacitly sanctioned
by a Party. The obligation of nondiscriminatory measures, by
express exclusion, does not extend to the establishment, acquisi-
tion or expansion activities of an investor. This is a significant
difference from the activities of an investor protected by the
national treatment and most favored nation treatment standards
of Article 11 (1). The Parties to the treaty impliedly retain the
right to treat investors differently with regards to the establish-
ment, acquisition and expansion of investment.
The prohibition in Article II (3)(b) focuses on the impairment
of an investment by "unreasonable and discriminatory" mea-
sures.24 Measures that "impair" should be broadly interpreted
because the Parties modified impair with the phrase "in any
way."24' The reach of the duty imposed by subparagraph (3)(b) is,
234. Id. Annex para. (5).
235. See 30 U.S.C.§ 181 (2000).
236. See 10 U.S.C. §7435 (2000).
237. See Albright, supra note 26, at XV.
238. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. II(3)(b); see
generally U. N. Ctr. On Transnational Corporations, Bilateral Investment Treaties,
supra note 50, at 30-31.
239. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. II(3)(b).
240. Id.
241. Id.; See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 62.
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however, limited to only those measures that are both unreasona-
ble and discriminatory.242 Whether a measure is unreasonable
and results in discriminatory impairment of the management,
conduct, operation or disposition of an investment may only be
determined on a case-by-case basis. Customary international law,
which may be a source for guidance, prohibits discriminatory
treatment in which governmental measures result in actual injury
to an alien and the governmental measure is undertaken with the
intent to harm the alien.
243
Political Subdivisions and State Enterprises
The obligations accepted by the United States and Honduras
when they entered into the treaty apply to the political subdivi-
sions of the Parties,2 44 as well as to state enterprises. 245 The fed-
eral governments, irrespective of whether they have the domestic
right to control sub-federal authorities, are responsible for the
actions of their political subdivisions.2 4' Accordingly, it will not be
a defense in the resolution of a dispute between an investor and a
state that the measure at issue was the action of a political
subdivision.247
The United States - Honduras treaty obligations assumed by
the Parties also apply to state enterprises "in the exercise of any
regulatory, administrative or other governmental authority dele-
gated to it" by a Party.248 The United States and Honduras specifi-
cally agreed that state enterprises, in the sale or other
distribution of their goods and services, would accord covered
investments "national and most favored nation treatment."249
Transfers
Government foreign exchange measures impact foreign inves-
tors' ability to efficiently administer their investment opera-
242. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. III(3)(b).
243. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 62.
244. See United States-Honduras Investment Treaty supra note 5, art. XV (1)(a);
McGhie, supra note 11, at 112; Vandevelde, supra note 14, at 649.
245. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. XV(2).
246. See Dana H. Freyer et al., Bilateral Investment Treaties and Arbitration, 52-
MAY Disp. Res. J. 74, 76 (1998).
247. Cf. Vienna Convention, supra note 49, art. 27 (internal domestic law is not a
justification for the failure to perform a treaty obligation).
248. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. XV(2).
249. Id. art. II(1).
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tions.5 ° Article V of the BIT responds to these issues by
establishing the types of transfers that may be made into and out
of the host country, and the limitations that the Parties may
impose on those transfers.5 In Article VI, the United States and
Honduras balanced the competing interests of the host state's
"monetary sovereignty,"252 and the right to regulate their cur-
rency, with the interest of the investor and the investor's home
state in unrestricted transferability.
23
Types of Transfers
Article V (1) provides that "[e]ach Party shall permit all trans-
fers relating to a covered investment to be made freely and with-
out delay.""4 Transfers that are considered "relating to" a covered
investment are set forth in Article V (1)(a) through (e). 5 ' Accord-
ing to the treaty, "[s]uch transfers include:
(a) contributions to capital;
(b) profits, dividends, capital gains, and proceeds from the
sale of all or any part of the investment or from the par-
tial or complete liquidation of the investment;
(c) interest, royalty payments, management fees, and tech-
nical assistance and other fees;
(d) payments under a contract, including a loan agree-
ment; and
(e) compensation pursuant to Articles III and IV, and pay-
ments arising out of an investment dispute."266
The language of Article V (1) indicates that the Parties intended
the types of transfers encompassed within the agreement to be
broadly interpreted.5 7 The transfers include "all transfers" relat-
250. See FOREIGN INVESTMENT ADVISORY SERVICE, supra note 146, at 35; see
generally SoRNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 252 (addressing repatriation of profits).
251. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. V; See
generally World Bank Guidelines, supra note 128, at 301-02; ROBERT, supra note 70,
at 9,
252. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 85 n. 234.
253. See id. at 85.
254. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. V(1).
255. See id. art. V(1) (a)-(e); see generally COMEAUX, supra note 14, at 107-08.
256. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. V(1); U.
N. Ctr. on Transanational Corporations, Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note
50, at 42.
257. See generally DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 90 (stating that such
provisions are not necessarily exhaustive); HENKIN, supra note 10, at 767 (defining
"returns" broadly); Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, supra note 1, at 10
(stating that most treaties encompass the principle of free transferability of
investment-related payments).
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ing to covered investments with the agreement illustratively list-
ing specific types.25
"Contributions to capital" is the first transfer that is specified
in the United States - Honduras treaty.250 Although some BIT's
specifically guarantee investors the right to transfer additional
capital into the host state,6 ° the United States - Honduras BIT
simply provides for "contributions to capital."26 ' However, inves-
tors, relying on the broad language of Article V, should be entitled
to make initial, as well as additional capital contributions pro-
vided that those contributions have a nexus with the covered
investment.
Returns on the investment are provided for in Article V (1)(b),
as are the proceeds from the sale or liquidation of an invest-
ment.2 Article V (1)(b) addresses the transfer of "profits, divi-
dends and capital gains," as well as the proceeds from the sale of
all or part of the investment, or from the total or partial liquida-
tion of the investment.262 The transfer rights accorded in Article V
(1)(b) complement the treatment obligations of Article 11 (1), as
they relate to the "sale or other disposition" of an investment.2"
Article V (1)(c) relates to the transfer of "interest, royalty pay-
ments, management fees, and technical assistance and other
fees. 2 61 With regard to the transfers discussed in Article V (1)(c),
the United States - Honduras treaty is neutral as to whether the
investment has the status of a debtor or creditor.266
Transfers of payments that are made pursuant to contracts
are provided for in Article V (1)(d). The United States - Honduras
treaty does not restrict nor does it offer any indication of the types
of contracts that may call for payments from an investment,
except that they include payments made pursuant to loan agree-
ments. 67 The transfer of funds to repay indebtedness is limited to
transfers that are "related to" the covered investment. 6 This
258. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. V(1).
259. Id. art. V(1)(a).
260. See Escobar, supra note 61, at 90.
261. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. V(1)(a).
262. See id. art. V(1)(b).
263. Id.
264. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 93.
265. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. V(1)(c).
266. See generally SoRARAJAH, supra note 2, at 253 (stating that repatriation
clauses include profits and -other payments that are made to a foreign investor);
DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 93.
267. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. V(1)(d).
268. Id. art. V(i).
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requirement, similar to that of other investment treaties, restricts
the transfer of funds for loan repayment to those funds that were
borrowed for the purpose of investing in the territory of either the
United States or Honduras.26
The final category of transfers includes compensation
received as the result of expropriation,7 ° for losses suffered due to
civil disturbance,27 ' and for payments that arise out of an invest-
ment dispute. Article V (1)(e) expressly provides for the transfer
of "compensation" for expropriation or losses from civil distur-
bance, while Article IV, which addresses the Parties' obligations
for losses owing to civil disturbance, provides for either restitution
or compensation.7 "Restitution" is not a treaty-defined term. A
strict interpretation of Article V (1)(e) and a Party's assertion that
it provided "restitution," not compensation, will set the stage for
resolution of the meaning of "restitution," and whether the United
States - Honduras treaty also mandates that the Parties permit
the transfer of "restitution."
The reference to payments that arise from investment dis-
putes is unique to United States BIT practice. 4 This is an
acknowledgement of the increasingly significant role dispute reso-
lution plays in foreign direct investment and the interest of the
Parties in facilitating non-diplomatic, expeditious dispute resolu-
tion. The United States - Honduras treaty states that such pay-
ments must "arise out of' an investment dispute.2 7 Transfers
"arising out of' investment disputes include arbitral recoveries
beyond simply the award of damages and may include costs, inter-
est and other awards unique to a particular investor-host state
undertaking.
The payment of remuneration by an investor in the host coun-
try to employees or independent contractors that are not nationals
of the host country is a transfer of significant importance. Ameri-
can and Honduran negotiators either chose not address or could
not agree whether foreign nationals who are paid in the host coun-
try should be permitted to transfer all or part of their salaries to
269. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 92.
270. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. III; see
generally SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 253 (stating that repatriation of compensation
is generally in a separate clause).
271. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. IV.
272. See id. art. IX (1).
273. See id. art. IV(2).
274. See generally DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 94.
275. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. V(1)(e).
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their home country or a third country.2 7 Relying on Article VII,
which addresses the entry and sojourn of aliens, as well as on
Article V (1)(d), which addresses transfers that relate to payments
made under contract, a position may be advanced that remunera-
tion transfers, if not specifically provided for in the treaty, are
within the spirit of the agreement.2 7  Precluding employees from
transferring their salaries would create an impediment to the
effective exercise by the investment of the rights extended under
Article VII to employ foreign nationals. 27 Furthermore, investors
are less likely to be able to employ the most capable individuals if
those persons have concerns about the ability to repatriate their
salaries. Since investors are authorized to transfer payments
made under a contract, and compensation is paid pursuant to con-
tracts of employment, whether directly to employees or indirectly
to independent contractors, investors should consider making a
percentage of their compensation payments in the host country
and a percentage in their home or a third country."'
Limitations on Transfers
The obligation of the Parties to permit transfers relating to
covered investments is not without qualification.8 Honduras and
the United States in Article V (4), agreed that they may prevent
transfers through the "equitable, non-discriminatory and good
faith application" of four areas of their domestic laws.8 ' Those
laws are as follows: "(a) bankruptcy, insolvency or the protection
of rights of creditors; (b) issuing, trading or dealing in securities;
(c) criminal or penal offenses; or (d) ensuring compliance with
orders or judgments in adjudicatory proceedings."" 2
The laws listed in Article V (4)(a) through (d) present issues of
interpretation. Bankruptcy laws and those designed for the pro-
tection of creditors require an initial determination of debtor and
creditor status.2 3 Although issuing and trading securities may be
276. See generally DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 93-94 (addressing the issue
of transferring personal remuneration).
277. See Vienna Convention, supra note 49, art. 31(1).
278. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. VII.
279. See id. art. V(1)(d).
280. See id. art. V; see generally COMEAUX, supra note 14, at 108 (addressing
currency reporting laws); U.N. Ctr. on Transnational Corporations, Bilateral
Investment Treaties, supra note 50, at 44-45.
281. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. V(4).
282. Id.
283. See id. Protocol para. (1) (confirming the understanding that Article V(4)(a)
includes the application of Honduran labor laws relating to the protection of
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understood, "dealing" in securities is less specific.284 Offenses set
forth in a Party's criminal code should fall within Article V (4)(c),
but administrative action is neither precisely civil nor criminal.
The enforcement of orders or judgments in "adjudicatory proceed-
ings" encompasses actions of the courts, yet it is unresolved
whether orders or decisions of administrative bodies also fall
within the parameters of Article V (4)(c). 85
Disputes concerning the denial of transfers based on a Party's
assertion of its rights under Article V (4) will also involve whether
the law and proceedings are equitable, non-discriminatory and
applied in good faith. Equitable application mandates that the
proceedings conform to the imprecise standard of "principles of
justice and right."6
Recourse to the treatment standards of Article I assists in
providing substance to the Article V (4) obligation of non-discrimi-
nation.287 One of the basic tenets of the treaty is that investors be
treated no less favorable than an investor of a Party or an investor
of a third-country."' The meaning underlying the non-discrimina-
tory application of the host country's laws and regulations may
also be found in Article III which mandates that expropriation be
undertaken in a "non-discriminatory" manner.
2 89
An international understanding of a Party's "good faith"
application of its bankruptcy, securities, or criminal laws, and pro-
ceedings to ensure compliance with adjudicatory orders or judg-
ments may be obtained from an application of the Vienna
Convention (the "Convention"). Article 26 of the Convention
requires that the Parties of a treaty perform their obligations in
"good faith."290 A body of international jurisprudence applying
this standard in different factual situations offers substance to the
meaning of "good faith."
preferential creditor's rights); see generally COMEAUX, supra note 14, at 108 (providing
that a host state may pass laws protecting creditors rights which laws may interfere
with an investor's right to freely transfer currency).
284. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. V(4)(b).
285. Id. art. V(4)(c).
286. BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 482 (5th ed. 1979).
287. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. 11(1).
288. See id. art. II(1).
289. Id. art. I(1).
290. Vienna Convention, supra note 49, art. 26 (setting forth the principle of pacta
sunt servanda).
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Convertibility and Exchange Rates
The United States - Honduras treaty provides that the Par-
ties are to permit transfers in and out of their countries "freely
and without delay."2 91 The BIT, unlike other investment treaties,
does not provide either Party with the right to institute currency
or exchange controls during times of "exceptional economic or
financial circumstances."292 Although the BIT is void of any provi-
sion addressing periods of exchange shortfalls, times of financial
stringency may give rise to the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus,
making an absolute right of repatriation indefensible. 93
Additionally, the United States - Honduras treaty mandates
that transfers shall be made "without delay."294 This provision is
consistent with Article III on expropriation which also calls for the
payment of compensation to be made "without delay."29 In con-
trast, the BIT practices of other states, frequently only require
that transfers be made "without undue delay," thus indicating
that some delay is acceptable. 96
Article V(2) provides investors with the entitlement to make
transfers in "freely usable currency at the market rate of exchange
prevailing on the date of transfer."297 The phrase "freely usable
currency" is also employed in Article III on expropriation, but in
neither article is it defined. The International Monetary Fund,29
291. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. V(1); see
Siqueiros, supra note 49, at 263.
292. See generally SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 252 (quoting language in a
Singapore - United Kingdom treaty permitting the implementation of exchange
controls); Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, supra note 1, at 10 (stating that
balance of payment concerns result in the inclusion of currency transfer limitations).
293. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 252; See generally Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco
Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) rev'd 757 F. 2d 516
(2d Cir. 1985) (interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act and the Act of State
doctrine in litigation before U.S. courts addressing the decision of a foreign sovereign
to enact foreign exchange controls).
294. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. V(1).
295. Id. art. 111(2).
296. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 95 (noting that German treaties
define "undue delay" to mean a transfer "effected within such period as is normally
required for the completion of transfer formalities. The said period shall commence
on the day on which the relevant request has been submitted and may on no account
exceed two months.").
297. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. V(2).
298. The International Monetary Fund is an organization composed of 184
member-countries with the purpose of fostering "international monetary cooperation,
exchange stability, and orderly exchange arrangements .. " The IMF plays an
important role in the resolution of member-country exchange short-falls. Available at
http://www.imf.org.
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the source of the phrase, employs it to currently reference the
United States Dollar, the Japanese Yen, the German Mark, the
French Franc and the British Pound Sterling.29 9 While some BIT's
stipulate the currency of transfer and others call for transfers in
the currency of the original investment,"°' the United States -
Honduras treaty affords the Parties latitude as to the currency of
the transfer.
The United States - Honduras treaty imposes on the host
country, the risk that an investor may make transfers of a freely
usable currency into the territory of a Party which currency may
subsequently experience a monetary crisis. Since the issue of free
usability is relevant on the date of the transfer, it is possible that
an investor may desire to transfer currency out of the country at a
time when the currency that was transferred into the host country
is no longer "freely usable."3"1 The tenor of Article V is that the
Parties should not manipulate the transfer of currency to the det-
riment of the investor. Utilizing the "market rate of exchange pre-
vailing on the date of transfer," 2 essentially the "spot rate,"
30 3
confirms this view. The question that remains is what "market"
the Parties anticipate will be used, such as Tegucigalpa, New
York, London or Paris, if the rates of exchange vary from market
to market.
Entry and Sojourn
The opportunity for investors and their representatives to
travel to and within the host country is essential to successful for-
eign direct investing. Article VII of the treaty addresses this
necessity." 4 Subject to the laws of Honduras and the United
States "relating to the entry and sojourn of aliens,"35 that is the
immigration laws of each country,0 6 investors of one Party are
entitled to travel to and within the territory of the other Party. 7
Honduran investors, pursuant to Article VII, are eligible to obtain
"treaty-investor visas," with American investors being accorded
299. See Albright, supra note 26, at IX.
300. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 94.
301. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. V(2).
302. Id.
303. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 94.
304. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. VII;
ROBERT, supra note 70, at 8.
305. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. VII (1)(a).
306. See Albright, supra note 26, at X.
307. See Vandevelde, supra note 218, at 512.
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similar treatment by the Honduran government.""
Article VII of the BIT sets forth the minimum obligations of
the United States and Honduras with regard to the entry and
sojourn of foreign investors. The Parties "shall permit... nationals
of the other Party" to "enter and remain" in their respective terri-
tories to engage in specifically delineated investment-related
activities."°9 Those activities include "establishing, developing,
administering or advising on the operations of an investment."310
Arising out of each investment are these factual issues: (1) "What
is the activity of the investor or the investor's representative?" and
(2) "What is the relationship between the activity and establish-
ing, developing, administering or advising on the operation of the
investment?" Although the United States - Honduras treaty does
not establish a specific time limit for travel within a Party's terri-
tory, the presence of an investor or an investor's representative
must bear a minimal relationship to the establishment or opera-
tion of the investment. 1'
The "nationals of the other Party" to whom the United States
- Honduras treaty confers entry and sojourn privileges, are indi-
vidual investors and employees of juridical entities. 2 The BIT
uses the word "employs" in the phrase "a company of the other
Party that employs them," but does not define employment sta-
tus." The question that arises is whether the representative of
an investing company who travels to the host state must be a
direct employee of the juridical entity or whether consultants and
other independent contractors retained or "employed" by the
investment will be accorded BIT entry and sojourn rights. Law-
yers, accountants, geologists, economists and others with unique
skills will frequently not be on the payroll of an investment, yet
they are essential to its successful establishment and operation.
Provided that the consultants are nationals of the state of the
investor or investing entity, a broad interpretation of the term
"employ" is in accord with the object and purpose of the United
States - Honduras treaty.
14
The investor, to obtain the entry and sojourn privileges of the
agreement, must "have committed" or be in the "process of com-
308. Albright, supra note 26, at X.
309. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. VII(1)(a).
310. Id.
311. See Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, supra note 1, at 10.
312. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. VII(1)a).
313. Id.
314. See Vienna Convention, supra note 49, art. 31(1).
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mitting" a "substantial amount of capital or other resources."315
The commitment and amount of capital or other resources raises
issues that are not resolved by the United States - Honduras
treaty. The act of "having committed""' capital or other resources
for the purpose of creating or acquiring an investment indicates a
degree of permanency in the decision to invest. The investor may
not be precluded from rescinding the actions concerning the
investment, but any decision to alter the investor's course would
come at a cost. The state of being in the "process of committing"31 '
assets to an investment is an earlier period of time. It is a time in
the investment process that represents action on the part of the
investor that is more than mere inquiry, but before the time in
which the investor has actually dedicated funds or resources.
The amount of capital or resources that the Parties consider
to be "substantial" is not defined in the United States - Honduras
treaty."8 The difficulty in determining an amount that will be
considered "substantial" for any given investor, any particular
investment, at any given time and under any unique economic cir-
cumstances, probably resulted in the decision to leave clarification
of the term "substantial" to subsequent consultation or dispute
resolution. Notwithstanding this, the definition of "company" in
Article I may offer guidance in the interpretation of the term "sub-
stantial."319 Considering that an investor may be a single individ-
ual or involve business entities ranging from sole proprietorships
to large corporations, the amount of capital or resources that must
be devoted to an investment before it will be considered "substan-
tial" may bear relationship to the type of investor.
32 0
The United States - Honduras treaty further provides that
the United States and Honduras "shall permit covered invest-
ments to engage top managerial personnel of their choice, regard-
less of nationality."32' This situation involves, for instance, a
juridical entity organized under Honduran law that has invested
315. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. VII(1)(a).
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. See Albright, supra note 26, at X.
319. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. I(a).
320. Cf. id. Annex (4) (reserving onto Honduras the right to withhold national
treatment in "small scale industry and commerce with a total invested capital of no
more than US $40,000").
321. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. VII(2); see
contra Albright, supra note 26, at X (stating that "top managerial personnel" are not
automatically entitled to entry and that they must "independently qualify for an
appropriate visa").
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or is contemplating operations in the United States and has in its
employ a Nicaraguan national. Although the United States -
Honduras treaty places no restrictions on the nationality of an
investment's senior management, if those individuals are not
Honduran or American they must "independently qualify for the
appropriate visa. 322 Since the United States - Honduras treaty
does not define "top managerial" positions, the discretion of immi-
gration officers in resolving this factual issue will be significant.
Expropriation
Customary international law sanctions state action that
expropriates or nationalizes the investments of foreigners within
the territory of the state.323 The United States - Honduras BIT, in
response to customary international law and the state takings
experienced in the 1950's through the 1970's,324 includes a detailed
article addressing expropriation and nationalization.2 Reflecting
the historical significance of expropriation and nationalization,
state takings are preceded in the United States - Honduras treaty
only by Article I, its definitions, and Article II, the standards of
treatment. Article III is a comprehensive article that sets forth
the basic premise on takings, the circumstances under which a
taking is permissible and the compensation due to the foreign
investor as a result of an expropriation or nationalization.32 6
Measures That Constitute Expropriation
Article III commences with the proposition that expropriation
and nationalization are permitted, but immediately focuses on
those measures that constitute a taking and the restrictions with
which the host state must comply in order for the taking to be
considered in compliance with the United States - Honduras
treaty.27 The United States - Honduras treaty addresses the
expropriation and nationalization of covered investments that are
undertaken "directly" by the host state, or "indirectly through
322. Albright, supra note 26, at X.
323. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 97; SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at
253; Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, supra note 1, at 11; ROBERT, supra note
70, at 9 - 10.
324. See generally Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, supra note 1, at 11;
COMEAUX, supra note 14, at 101; SoRNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 253.
325. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. III.
326. See id.; see generally World Bank Guidelines, supra note 128, at 303
(addressing expropriation and "unilateral alterations and termination of contracts").
327. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. III.
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measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization."32 The
United States - Honduras BIT, similar to many investment trea-
ties, does not define "expropriation," "nationalization," or those
measures deemed "tantamount to expropriation or nationaliza-
tion."39 The multitude of measures that a host state might under-
take, although not constituting de jure takings, preclude precise
definition.1
30
The characterization of state measures as either an expropri-
ation, nationalization, direct or indirect takings is not, however,
significant. Rather, it is the effect on the investor's rights and
interests which serves as the focal point.33 ' The examination of
these effects assists in determining those indirect measures that
are deemed to be "tantamount to expropriation or nationaliza-
tion."332 If the effect of the Party's action is similar to that which
would have resulted from a direct taking,33 the provisions of Arti-
cle III should operate to protect the national or juridical entity
involved.
Indirect taking or "creeping expropriation" is the incremental
erosion of a foreign investor's ownership interest."4 The Organi-
zation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),' an
organization of predominately developed countries, offered the fol-
lowing examples of indirect takings in its draft convention: (1)
excessive or arbitrary taxation; (2) prohibition of dividend distri-
bution coupled with compulsory loans; (3) imposition of adminis-
trators; (4) prohibition on employee termination; (5) refusal of
access to raw materials; and (6) refusal to grant essential export
or import authorization.3 An international arbitral tribunal
328. Id. at art. III(1); see generally SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 254 (providing
that some United States treaties state "any measure or series of measures"); ROBERT,
supra note 70, at 9.
329. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. I(1); see
DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 98.
330. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 99.
331. See id. at 100.
332. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. 111(1).
333. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 100.
334. See generally SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 254 (explaining "creeping
expropriation"); see also Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property, 1
ICSID REVIEW-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 41 (1986); DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 99
n.268; Albright, supra note 26, at IX.
335. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)is the
successor to the Organization of European Economic Co-operation. It has twenty-
nine members and provides a platform for the exchange of information and ideas on
economic and social policy. Available at http://www.oecd.org.
336. See Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property and Resolution of
the Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development on the
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called on to address indirect taking in Starrett Housing Corp. v.
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, concluded that
although Iran, the host state, did not issue any law or decree
expressly taking the foreign investor's property, its measures
interfered with the foreign investor's property interests to the
extent that it "must be deemed to have been expropriated.. .even
though the legal title to the property formally remains with the
original owner."
337
Early United States treaties provided lists of measures which
the Parties to those treaties deemed to constitute indirect tak-
ings.33 The measures included: (1) confiscatory taxes; (2) compul-
sory sale; (3) impairment of management or control; and (4)
impairment of economic value."3 9 The United States - Honduras
BIT does not include such a list, presumably because of the
restrictive effect it would have on the interpretation of measures
the Parties intended to constitute expropriation.
Similarly, the United States - Honduras treaty does not
address which Party bears the burden of proving that a taking has
occurred. The host state should bear the burden of establishing
that its taking meets the requirements of the treaty. Since tak-
ings, although permissible, are subject to intense inquiry and
since the host state is likely to be in possession of the documenta-
tion and information necessary to confirm observance of the treaty
terms, the host state should assume the initial burden of demon-
strating respect for its treaty obligations. The investor should
then have the opportunity to rebut the evidence proffered by the
host state.
Conditions Precedent
The United States - Honduras BIT, while recognizing the
authority of the Parties to expropriate or nationalize covered
investments, sets forth five requirements for considering a taking
as being in compliance with the treaty. 4 The requirements are as
follows: (1) the taking must have a public purpose; (2) it must be
done in a non-discriminatory manner; (3) the investor must
receive prompt, adequate and effective compensation; (4) the pro-
Draft Convention, OECD Publication No. 23081 (1967), reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 117
(1968).
337. Starrett Housing Corp. v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep., 23 I.L.M. 1090 (1983).
338. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 254.
339. See id.
340. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. III(1).
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cedures must accord due process of law; and (5) the taking must
be in harmony with the treatment obligations of Article 11 (3),
which are fair and equitable treatment, full protection and secur-
ity, and treatment not less than the minimum dictated by custom-
ary international law. 4'
Public Purpose
The public purpose requirement of Article III reiterates the
well-established principle of customary international law. 2 The
United States - Honduras treaty, in accord with international law
as to principle, is equally comparable in its lack of definition. 43
The absence of a treaty definition or an internationally accepted
understanding of "public purpose" coupled with the likelihood that
an arbitral tribunal will extend considerable weight to the host
state's subjective view of the taking44 warrants the establishment
of parameters.
The intention of the public purpose requirement in invest-
ment treaties is to safeguard investors from executive and legisla-
tive abuse and to deter host states from enacting measures that
have private, as opposed to public impetus. 45 The parameters of
takings extend from those measures designed to promote a public
good, to those with personal or foreign policy retaliatory
motives. 4 Variations employed in other treaties with purposes
similar to those of the United States - Honduras treaty include
expropriation or nationalization for the public benefit, a national
purpose, the public use, the public interest, in the interest of
national defense or security and takings with an internal public or
social basis.47
Non-discriminatory
The obligation of Article III (1), that takings be carried out in
a non-discriminatory manner, is a similarly well-established prin-
ciple of customary international law.34 While discriminatory tak-
341. See id.; Albright, supra note 26, at IX; see generally U.N. Ctr. On
Transnational Corporations, Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 50, at 53.
342. See SoRNRAH, supra note 2, at 253.
343. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 104.
344. SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 253.
345. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 105.
346. See id. at 104-05.
347. See id. at 105; U.N. Ctr. On Transnational Corporations, Bilateral Investment
Treaties, supra note 50, at 53-54.
348. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 253.
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ings may be contrary to the United States - Honduras treaty and
international law, the treaty does not define or offer examples of
takings done in a discriminatory manner. Discriminatory nation-
alization may be particularly difficult to substantiate when the
state is in a position to maintain that economics was the motivat-
ing factor. 9
The obligation that takings be non-discriminatory is strength-
ened by the obligations Honduras and the United States accepted
pursuant to Article I (1). Article 11 (1) mandates with respect to
specific activities, particularly the "sale or other disposition" of
covered investments, that investors be accorded national treat-
ment, most favored nation treatment and the better of national
treatment and most favored nation treatment. (Emphasis
added).3 5 If expropriation and nationalization are included within
the meaning of "other disposition," the host state must not only
engage in a non-discriminatory taking, but must also extend the
treatment standards of Article 11 to the taking of an investment. 51
Compensation
Should the United States or Honduras expropriate or nation-
alize the investment of a national or juridical entity of the other
Party, the taking state is obligated pursuant to Article 1II (1) to
pay the investor "prompt, adequate and effective compensation."352
The United States - Honduras treaty, in Article III (2), (3) and (4),
elaborates on the meaning of "prompt, adequate and effective"
compensation. 5 ' The compensation standard set forth in the
United States - Honduras BIT is known as the "Hull Formula,"3 4
named after former U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull who ini-
tially used the phrase. 55 It is the standard strenuously advocated
by the United States,356 as well as other capital exporting coun-
tries." 7 This standard is in contrast to that of the more flexible
349. See id. at 253-54.
350. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. II(1).
351. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 106. But cf Albright, supra note 26, at
IX (offering no suggestion that the principles of Article Il are applicable to
expropriation or nationalization).
352. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. III(1).
353. Id. art. I(2), (3) and (4); see also Albright, supra note 26, at IX; U.N. Ctr. On
Transnational Corporations, Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 50, at 55.
354. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 108; ROBERT, supra note 70, at 10.
355. See ALAN C. SwAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND EcoNoMics 774 (1991).
356. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 256.
357. See id. at 254.
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compensation standard of "appropriate compensation," generally
supported by capital importing countries. 5 8 Bargaining positions
and competition for foreign investment all factor into the decision
of capital-importing countries whether or not to agree to the Hull
Formula." 9
Amount of Compensation
Adequate compensation, pursuant to Article III (2), is
"equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated invest-
ment immediately before the expropriatory action was taken ("the
date of the expropriation")." 6 ° The United States - Honduras
treaty does not define "fair market value," but it does provide that
it "shall not reflect any change in value occurring because the
expropriatory action had become known before the date of expro-
priation."36' The taking state may not benefit from the impact
that public knowledge of an impending expropriation or nationali-
zation may have on the value of an investment. 2 Establishing
the date of the expropriatory action in an indirect taking will be
contentious. Doubt as to the precise date should be resolved in
favor of the investor, as the host state, once again, is more likely to
be in possession of relevant documentation and information.
The lack of factors for determining "fair market value" was
probably not an oversight, but rather a reflection that the Parties
could not agree on a specific set of criteria applicable to each
unique situation. A side letter to the 1982 investment treaty
between the United States and Panama363 provides that "both Par-
ties understand that the estimate of full value of expropriated
investment can be made using several methods of calculation
depending on the circumstances thereof."364 The United States -
Haiti investment treaty, a treaty signed but not yet ratified due to
political circumstances, stipulates that "compensation will be
equivalent to the fair market value of the investment, as deter-
358. Id. at 254; see also U.N. CHARTER, supra note 129, art. 2(2)(c) (providing for the
payment of "appropriate compensation").
359. See SoRNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 258.
360. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. II(2).
361. Id.
362. See Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, supra note 1, at 11; Escobar,
supra note 61, at 90.
363. See Treaty Between The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Panama Concerning the Treatment and Protection of
Investments, S. Treaty Doc. 99-14 (1986), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1227 (1982).
364. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 110 (quoting the side-letter between the
United States and Panama).
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mined according to different methods of calculation as appropriate
in each specific case."365
. The absence of treaty standards for determining "fair market
value," the imprecise nature of the measure and the particular
interests of the taking Party result in a host of considerations
being brought forward to determine the value of an investment. 66
The World Bank Guidelines (the "Guidelines"), include the value a
willing buyer would pay a willing seller, taking into consideration
the nature of the investment, its future potential, the length of
time the investment has been in operation, the percentage of tan-
gible assets to intangible assets, and "other relevant factors perti-
nent to the special circumstances of each case."3 6' The Guidelines,
without suggesting a single, definitive measure of fairness by
which compensation may be judged, consider profitability or the
lack thereof as an important consideration.3"8 Criteria in the
NAFTA for determining the fair market value of an expropriated
investment include "going concern value, asset value including
declared tax value of tangible property, and other criteria, as
appropriate.""9 A 1991 treaty between Israel and Romania pro-
vides for the inclusion of "equitable principles taking into account,
inter alia, the capital invested, its appreciation or depreciation,
current returns, replacement value and other relevant factors."37 °
Time and Manner of Payment
Investors whose investments have been expropriated or
nationalized are entitled to compensation "paid without delay"
and that is "fully realizable and freely transferable."71 Although
neither the term "prompt"372 in Article III (1), nor the phrase
"without delay"37 in Article III (2) are defined, the United States -
Honduras treaty should not be interpreted to mean that compen-
365. Id. at 110-11 (quoting Article III of the United States - Haiti investment
treaty).
366. Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, supra note 1, at 11 (providing that
"market value" is generally used to determine the value of expropriated investments);
Escobar, supra note 61, at 90.
367. World Bank Guidelines, supra note 128, at 304; see also DOLZER & STEVENS,
supra note 93, at 111.
368. See generally World Bank Guidelines, supra note 128, at 304; see also DOLZER
& STEVENS, supra note 93, at 111.
369. NAFTA, supra note 181, art. 1110(2).
370. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 111.





sation must be paid immediately following the taking. The BIT
permits the allowance of delay, but only as it relates to the formal-
ities necessary to transfer funds. Balance of payment circum-
stances may impede a Party's ability to transfer a large sum of
currency, particularly foreign currency, out of the host country.
3 74
Nevertheless, these circumstances are not a treaty-acceptable
basis to delay the payment of compensation 7 5 The United States
- Honduras treaty, unlike British investment treaties, does not
provide for the payment of compensation in installments. 76
The Protocol of the United States - Egypt investment treaty
7
offers insight, from the American perspective, into what is consid-
ered a permissible delay."' The investment agreement that the
United States negotiated with Egypt specifies that "the term
'prompt' does not necessarily mean instantaneous. 'The intent is
that the Party diligently and expeditiously carry out necessary
formalities.' 3
German investment treaty practice incorporates the identical
phrase employed in the United States - Honduras BIT, "without
delay," and declares that the taking state will be in compliance
with its treaty obligation if payment is "effected within such
period as is normally required for the completion of transfer for-
malities."3"' German investment treaties further provide that the
applicable period "shall commence on the day on which the rele-
vant request has been submitted and may on no account exceed
two months."38'
Compensation, in order to be "effective," must be "fully realiz-
able and freely transferable."3 2 Whether a particular currency on
a particular date is "fully realizable and freely transferable," given
that the United States - Honduras treaty offers no understanding
374. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 113.
375. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. III.
376. See generally DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 113 (providing that British
treaties address the periodic payment of compensation).
377. See Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Egypt Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, S. Treaty Doc. 99-24, Protocol (1986) [hereinafter United
States - Egypt Investment Treaty].
378. See id.
379. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 112; United States - Egypt Investment
Treaty, supra note 377, Protocol.
380. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 112 (quoting the language of German
investment treaties).
381. Id.
382. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. 111(2); see
DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 112.
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of the phrase, can only be determined on a case-by-case basis tak-
ing into account all of the circumstances.
The United States - Honduras treaty in Article 111 (3) and (4)
expressly addresses situations in which the fair market value of
an expropriated investment is denominated in "freely usable cur-
rency" and "currency that is not freely usable."33 The substance of
Article III (3) and (4) is that investors are to be fully and com-
pletely compensated for the fair market value of their investment,
with interest accruing from the date of the expropriatory action
until the investor receives total payment.3 8 4 If the fair market
value of the investment is denominated in a freely usable cur-
rency, the investor is to receive, in addition to the value of the
investment, "interest at a commercially reasonable rate for that
currency" through the date of payment. 5 If the fair market value
of the investment is not denominated in a currency that is freely
usable, the compensation paid must initially be "converted into
the currency of payment at the market rate of exchange prevailing
on the date of the payment."8 6 The taking state is then required
to pay the fair market value of the investment on the date of
expropriation "converted into a freely usable currency at the mar-
ket rate of exchange prevailing on that date."387 The taking state
must additionally pay interest accruing from the date of the tak-
ing through the date of payment.88 Interest accrues at "a com-
mercially reasonable rate. . .."I'
The Parties to the United States - El Salvador BIT set forth
their understanding of the phrase "commercially reasonable rate"
in the treaty Protocol. 90 A "commercially reasonable rate" for "a
freely usable currency may include a commercially reasonable
bank rate for that freely usable currency and a commercially rea-
sonably bond rate for government bonds for that freely usable cur-
rency." 9' The United States - El Salvador BIT's use of the word
383. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. 111(3) and (4).
384. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 113.
385. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. 111(3).
386. Id. art. 111(4).
387. Id. art. III(4)(a).
388. See id. art. IIL(4)(a).
389. Id. art. III(4)(b).
390. See Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of El Salvador Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Mar. 10, 1999, Protocol (1) [hereinafter United
States - El Salvador Investment Treaty]. The treaty has been signed, but has not yet
been ratified. It is available through the U.S. Dep't of State.
391. Id. Protocol para. (1).
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"may" indicates that other commercially reasonable rates will ful-
fill the purpose of confirming that investors do not suffer loss
while awaiting the receipt of payment.
Due Process
The obligation that the United States and Honduras shall
only expropriate or nationalize covered investments "in accor-
dance with due process of law"392 references the procedures uti-
lized by the host state in taking an investment. 93 Due process of
law, in the international context, is not entirely synonymous with
due process in the domestic setting.3" The United States - Hon-
duras treaty, and investment treaties in general, do not reference
domestic law addressing expropriation or nationalization, thereby
confirming the principle that international standards are
intended to judge the legitimacy of a taking.
395
Due process of law on the international plane wants for sub-
stance, although certain basic features exist. In order to effectu-
ate due process, the Parties should afford advance notification of a
taking, a just hearing conducted by an unbiased official, and a
decision on the legitimacy of the taking within a reasonable period
of time.3 19 The availability of review by the host state's courts has
also been asserted as an international due process standard. 97
Many investment treaties expressly provide for domestic judicial
review of state takings, which is in accordance with international
legal standards. 9 The United States - Honduras BIT does not
have such a provision.
Resorting to the domestic judicial system of the host country
by a Honduran or American investor to redress expropriation or
nationalization may result in the forfeiture of the right to compel
392. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. III(1).
393. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 106.
394. See id. at 107.
395. See id. at 106.
396. See id.
397. See id.; see United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. II
(4) (addressing the obligation of the Parties to provide "effective means of asserting
claims and enforcing rights with respect to covered investments.")
398. See generally DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 107 (quoting the
investment treaty between the United States and Tunisia as providing for "prompt
review by the appropriate judicial or administrative authorities," but further
mandating that the review confirm that the taking complied with the principles of
international law).
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arbitration. 9 The United States - Honduras BIT, while confer-
ring investor access to the domestic courts and administrative
tribunals to resolve investment disputes, expressly precludes
recourse to investor-state arbitration once the domestic route has
been exercised.4 °0
Losses Due to Armed Conflict and Civil Disturbance
A feature commonly found in bilateral investment treaties is
a provision relating to the treatment accorded foreign investment
for losses suffered by an investor due to armed conflict or internal
disorder." 1 The United States - Honduras investment treaty
addresses this issue in Article IV.4"2 The United States - Hondu-
ras BIT has two provisions in Article IV that address investment
losses suffered in the territory of the host state "owing to war or
other armed conflict, revolution, state of national emergency,
insurrection, civil disturbance, or similar events.""4 3 Article IV (1)
provides that "[each Party shall accord national treatment and
most favored nation treatment to covered investments as regards
any measure relating to losses that investments suffer in its terri-
tory" as the result of war or civil disturbance. 40 4 Article IV (2) sets
forth the obligation of the host state to make restitution or pay
compensation for the requisitioning or destruction of an invest-
ment by the host Party's military forces or other authorities." 5
The investment loss rights that are provided by Article IV,
relate to losses sustained by investments in the host state40 6 that
result from "war or other armed conflict, revolution, state of
national emergency, insurrection, civil disturbance, or similar
events."40 v The situations that trigger Article IV range from war
399. See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY
AND PRACTICE 125 (1992).
400. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. IX(2) and
(3).
401. See Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1991, supra note 1, at 10; McGhie,
supra note 11, at 117.
402. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. IV.
403. Id. art. IV(1) and (2).
404. Id. art. Iv(l); see ROBERT, supra note 70, at 9; Siqueiros, supra note 49, at 262.
405. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. IV(2)(a)
and (b).
406. See id. art. IV(1) (referencing "losses that investments suffer in its territory");
see id. art. IV(2) (specifying "that covered investments suffer losses in its territory");
see id. art. I (e) (defining "covered investment").
407. Id. art. IV(l) and (2); see DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 83.
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against foreign countries to entirely internal civil disorder.4"' Con-
sidering that the description of events includes an array of situa-
tions of differing degrees of conflict that illustratively provide for
"war or other armed conflict" at one extreme and "civil distur-
bance, or similar events" at the other, Article IV should be broadly
interpreted to the advantage of the investor.4 °0
The obligations of Honduras and the United States pursuant
to Article IV, unlike the list of triggering events, have been nar-
rowly drawn. Article IV (1) obligates the Parties to accord covered
investments "national treatment and most favored nation treat-
ment" as regards any measure relating to investment losses in
their respective territories.4 10 The Parties must treat the invest-
ment losses of an investor of the other Party in the same manner
as they would treat the investment losses of one of their own
nationals or juridical entities. The United States and Honduras
must also afford such investment losses the same treatment that
the host Party extends to losses suffered by an investor from a
third state. If neither the Party nor any of its political subdivi-
sions"' affords the losses of investors of the host country or of any
third country special treatment, investment losses incurred by
nationals or juridical entities of the other Party owing to armed
conflict or civil disturbance are not entitled to any special recovery
privilege.
The total or partial loss of a covered investment that meets
the criteria set forth in Article IV (2)(a) and (b) obligates the host
Party to make restitution or pay compensation.412 Restitution or
compensation is only due an investor if the loss incurred results
from the "requisitioning of all or part of such investments by the
Party's forces or authorities" or the "destruction of all or part of
such investments by the Party's forces or authorities that was not
required by the necessity of the situation."413 The BIT does not
offer guidance concerning the circumstances that must exist for
the destruction of an investment to be considered as having been
"required by the necessity of the situation. "414
The "combat exception" to treaty liability, although involving
408. See HENKIN, supra note 10, at 766; see generally SoRNARAJAH, supra note 2, at
263 (addressing "ordinary mob violence" that the host state failed to control).
409. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. IV(l) and (2).
410. Id. art. IV(1).
411. See id. art. XV(1).
412. See id. art. IV(2).
413. Id. art. IV(2) (a) and (b).
414. Id. art. IV(2) (b).
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action by a Party in preservation of its national security or inter-
nal civil order, should not be considered self-judging absent
express language to this effect.415 Deference from arbitral bodies
should be accorded to decisions of the Parties regarding these
matters, however a Party's actions should ultimately be assessed
from an international perspective.416 If the United States and
Honduras had intended for this exception to financial liability to
be self-judging, they could have utilized language that would have
ensured that result. The American and Salvadorian negotiators
in Article XIV of the United States - El Salvador investment
agreement, for example, drafted the treaty so that each country,
in the fulfillment of its international obligations to maintain peace
or in the protection of its national security, could apply any mea-
sure "it considered necessary." 17 The standard in Article XIV of
the United States - El Salvador BIT, unlike Article IV of the
United States - Honduras BIT, is self-judging.
418
The issue of the "necessity of the situation" was addressed in
the British decision in the matter of Burmah Oil Co. v. Lord Advo-
cate.4 9 The property in question was destroyed during World War
II to prevent it from falling into the hands of the advancing enemy
army. The House of Lords, interpreting the British Crown Suits
Act of 1857, concluded that because the property was destroyed in
advance of possibly being obtained by the enemy, it was not
destroyed in combat.4"' The United States - Honduras treaty,
unlike the British Crown Suits Act, does not mandate that the
property be destroyed in combat, only that the situation necessi-
tated its destruction. The standard in the United States - Hondu-
ras treaty provides the Parties with greater latitude and limits
those circumstances in which an investor may obtain recovery for
the loss of an investment.
The "combat action" exception also arose in arbitral proceed-
ings before the International Centre for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID) involving the interpretation of an
investment agreement between Sri Lanka and the United King-
dom.421 The property in Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. The
Republic of Sri Lanka was a shrimp culture farm that was
415. See Shihata, supra note 130, at 57-58.
416. See id.
417. United States - El Salvador Investment Treaty, supra note 390, at art. XIV(1).
418. See id.; cf Vandevelde, supra note 14, at 703.
419. See Burmah Oil Co. v. Lord Advocate, [1965] App. Cas. 75, (H.L. 1964).
420. See id.
421. See Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. The Republic of Sri Lanka, Award of
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destroyed by the Sri Lankan military based on information that it
was being used by separatist elements.422 The arbitral panel,
which consisted of an Egyptian, French and Ghanaian national,
concluded that the actions of the Sri Lankan forces qualified as
"combat action."43 The tribunal also concluded, however, that the
agreement at issue afforded protection pursuant to customary
international law, and that this protection included an affirmative
duty on the part of the host state to safeguard investments. 4 The
failure of Sri Lanka to protect the shrimp farm, according to the
arbitral panel, resulted in liability pursuant to customary interna-
tional law that took precedent over the combat exception to liabil-
ity.42 The dissent in Asian Agricultural Products maintained that
the treaty provisions excluding liability were special provisions
that derogated from the general principles of customary interna-
tional law and should have primacy.4 26
Access to Judicial and Administrative Process
The United States and Honduras in Article II of the invest-
ment treaty provide investors with the right to utilize the judicial
and administrative systems of the respective countries to resolve
conflicts that arise between private parties in business matters.
Each Party, pursuant to Article 11 (4), is obligated to "provide
effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights with
respect to covered investments." '4 27 Two primary issues arise in
the interpretation of this aspect of Article II. The initial issue con-
cerns what constitutes "asserting claims" or "enforcing rights."42
The second issue involves the "means" by which the Parties are to
make their judicial and administrative systems available. 42 9
The only express limitation in Article II (4) involves the types
of claims and rights that an investor may seek to secure through
June 27, 1990 of ICSID in Case No. ARB/87/3, Yearbook Comm. Arb'n. XVII 106
(1992); see also McGhie, supra note 11, at 114.
422. See Asian Agricultural Products Ltd., No. ARB/87/3.
423. Id.; see SORNALAJAH, supra note 2, at 260-63.
424. See id.
425. See id.
426. See id. at 263.
427. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. 11 (4); see
generally Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprise,
Organization For Economic Cooperation and Development, Workshop on "Foreign
Direct Investment Policy and Promotion In Latin America" Report (1999) (stressing
the importance of a transparent judicial and regulatory system).
428. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. 11(4).
429. Id.
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access to the judicial or administrative structures. The claims or
rights that an investor may assert are limited to only those "with
respect to covered investments."430 A better understanding of Arti-
cle I (4) may be obtained from a reading of the article as a whole,
particularly Article 11 (1), which addresses the activities that are
entitled to specific treatment by each Party.431 Article II (1)
focuses on the establishment, acquisition, expansion, manage-
ment, conduct, operation and the sale or other disposition of a cov-
ered investment. Reading Article II paragraphs (1) and (4)
together, an investor's right of access to a Party's judicial or
administrative system is available to address all issues, from the
initial establishment of an investment through its ultimate
disposition.
Explicit from a reading of the entire agreement is that Article
11 (4) does not permit recourse to the domestic judicial or adminis-
trative system for the resolution of disputes between an investor
and a host-Party. Article IX, which addresses investment dis-
putes, provides for the resolution of these differences. 4 3  An
"investment dispute" is defined in the treaty as a "dispute
between a Party and a national or company of the other Party
arising out of or relating to an investment authorization, an
investment agreement or an alleged breach of any right conferred,
created or recognized" by the treaty with respect to a covered
investment.4 33 Although Article 11 (4) is broadly written to encom-
pass a multitude of actions, Article IX specifically addresses
"investment disputes."4 4 Access to the host state's judicial or
administrative tribunals is not conferred by Article 11 (4) for the
resolution of a matter considered to be an "investment dispute."43"
Article 11 (4) states that the "means" of asserting a claim or
enforcing a right must be "effective." 36 No definition is provided
for determining when a Party should be deemed to have provided
"effective means," mere access to the judicial and administrative
process, without more, does not meet the standard. There must be
a fair and impartial system through which a timely and reasoned
determination may be rendered in order for the assertion of a
claim to be effective. The means must also be available, once a
430. Id.
431. See Vienna Convention, supra note 49, art. 31(1).
432. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. IX.
433. Id. art. IX(1).
434. Id. art. IX.
435. Id. art. IX(2)(a).
436. Id. art. 11(4).
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claim or right has been successfully asserted, for the investor to
utilize the system to enforce all judicially or administratively con-
firmed rights.
Article 11 (5) complements Article 11 (4) by providing that
"[e]ach Party shall ensure that its laws, regulations, administra-
tive practices and procedures of general application, and adjudica-
tory decisions that pertain to or affect covered investments are
promptly published or otherwise made publicly available."4"7 One
of the goals of Article 11 (5) is the effective assertion of claims and
enforcement of rights through transparent legal, judicial and
administrative systems.
Consultation and Dispute Resolution
The resolution of disputes relating to the United States -
Honduras treaty and direct investment is provided for in Articles
IX, X and XI.43' The United States - Honduras treaty includes the
customary provisions addressing consultation and dispute resolu-
tion between the Parties involving state-to-state matters, but
additionally provides the means for investors to pursue invest-
ment-related issues directly with the host country.3 9 It is the
presence of the investor-state arbitration provision, creating inter-
national obligations on the part of the United States and Hondu-
ras, which is most significant.44 The direct means for foreign
investors to protect their investments in a neutral forum
"depoliticizes" the process and imparts investor confidence."'
Investors no longer need to exclusively rely on their home states to
espouse their positions through diplomatic channels, and can
avoid the risks associated with litigating before possibly impartial
local tribunals. 2
Consultation
The representatives of Honduras and the United States in
Article VIII of the treaty committed their countries to promptly
engage in consultation in advance of instituting arbitration to
437. Id. art. 11(5).
438. See id. art. IX, X and XI; see World Bank Guidelines, supra note 128, at 306
(addressing dispute settlement).
439. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 119.
440. See ROBERT, supra note 70, at 11.
441. SoRNARA J, supra note 2, at 266.
442. See Carlyn Kolker, When Nations Go Bust, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Nov. 2003,
at 92.
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resolve issues that arise between the Parties.443 The obligation to
consult is the initial method set forth in the treaty for resolving
Party-to-Party disagreement.444 Consultation offers the Parties
the possibility of prompt resolution of a matter that is only availa-
ble when parties with conflicting positions meet face-to-face.44
Consultations may be sought to "resolve any disputes in connec-
tion with the [t]reaty," or to "discuss any matter relating to the
interpretation or application... or the realization of the objectives
of the treaty." ' The Parties should resort to the Preamble for an
understanding of the United States - Honduras treaty objectives.
Article VIII only mandates consultation for the resolution of
state-to-state issues. When read in conjunction with Article IX,
addressing investor-state investment disputes, and Article X pro-
viding for government-to-government arbitration, Article VIII pre-
cludes the Parties from compelling consultations on matters that
directly involve investors. Nothing in the United States - Hondu-
ras treaty prevents the United States and Honduras from engag-
ing in diplomatic discussions concerning matters that are
principally investor-state issues, but compelling such discussions
would re-inject politics into the process and is prohibited.
Although consultations are to be undertaken "promptly," the
United States - Honduras treaty does not set a time period within
which exchanges should be initiated or completed,447 nor does it
address the level of diplomatic personnel that must participate.
The obligation to consult and to do so promptly should be carried
out in good faith,4 8 with the understanding that dilatory tactics
should not frustrate a Party's entitlement to pursue Article XI
arbitration. The requirement to consult should be satisfied when
the Ambassador of one Party addresses the issue at hand with the
relevant ministry of the other, although consultations between
other officials may suffice. 9
443. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. VIII.
444. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 121; McGhie, supra note 11, at 119.
445. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 121.
446. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. VIII; see
Siqueiros, supra note 49, at 264.
447. See McGhie, supra note 11, at 119.
448. See Vienna Convention, supra note 49, art. 31 (stating that treaties should be
interpreted in good faith).
449. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 123.
486
US-HONDURAS BIT
Dispute Resolution Between the Governments of Honduras
and The United States
Intergovernmental Arbitral Tribunal Jurisdiction
Differences between Honduras and the United States con-
cerning the interpretation or application of the United States -
Honduras treaty that the Parties cannot resolve through Article
VIII consultations "or other diplomatic channels" may be submit-
ted to arbitration for binding resolution. 5" Arbitration pursuant
to Article X, although limited to matters concerning the "interpre-
tation and application" of the United States - Honduras treaty,
could bring purportedly internal, political matters within the
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal if broadly construed. 5'
This situation arose in the interpretation of the United States
- Nicaragua Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.'52
Nicaragua, as a result of the action of the United States involving
the "Contras," instituted proceedings before the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), the judicial arm of the United Nations,
alleging that the United States violated its sovereignty."3 The
United States attempted to preclude the ICJ from hearing the
matter on the grounds that the issues were beyond the Court's
jurisdiction. The United States maintained that the issues raised
by Nicaragua involved its essential security interests.5 The
Court declined the position of the United States stating that the
matter concerned a dispute relating to the "interpretation or
application" of the FCN treaty and was properly before the ICJ.55
State-to-state arbitration clauses may also create an expan-
sive basis for arbitral tribunal jurisdiction if a state's activity with
regard to the promotion of conditions favorable to the inward or
outward flow of investment is subject to review.5 6 The United
450. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. VIII and X;
Siqueiros, supra note 49, at 264.
451. SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 272.
452. See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, U.S.-
Nicar., 9 U.S.T. 449.
453. See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U. S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Jurisdiction and Admisibility)
[hereinafter Nicar. v. U. S.].
454. See Shihata, supra note 130, at 58 n.49.
455. Nicar. v. U. S., 1984 I.C.J. at 442, para 113.; see generally Asian Agricultural
Products Ltd. v. The Republic of Sri Lanka, Award of June 27, 1990 of ICSID in Case
No. ARB/87/3 Yearbook Comm'n. Arb'n. XVII 106 (1992) (a case in which the conduct
of a civil war was subject to inquiry by a tribunal established to address investment
disputes).
456. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 273.
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States - Honduras BIT precludes this inquiry. 47 Article VIII con-
sultations only mandate that the Parties "discuss any matter
relating. . .to the realization of the objectives of the [tlreaty.
4 5 8
Arbitration pursuant to Article X does not, however, impose an
obligation to arbitrate issues that concern the realization of the
treaty objectives. 9 The reluctance of the United States and Hon-
duras to extend arbitral review to matters beyond the interpreta-
tion or application of the agreement reduces the Parties' concerns
that their internal policies will be subject to international scru-
tiny, but it also limits the protection available to their respective
foreign direct investors.46 °
Law Applicable to Disputes Between The Parties
Arbitral decisions resolving disputes between Honduras and
the United States are to be made "in accordance with the applica-
ble rules of international law."4"' Article X (1) reinforces the pre-
sumption that international agreements are not governed by
domestic state law, but rather, by international law.462 Since the
treaty references "[the applicable rules of international law,"
463
without limitation, the international law applicable to the resolu-
tion of state-party disputes is customary international law.6
4
Customary international law, as previously discussed, consists of
those rules of international governance "where the existence of the
rule is established by general and consistent practice of States fol-
lowed by them from a sense of legal obligation."46 Absent a "con-
cordant practice of a number of States acquiesced in by others;
and a conception that the practice is required by or consistent
with the prevailing law (the opinio juris)" a rule should not be
accepted and applied by an arbitral tribunal as international
457. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. X.
458. Id. art. VIII.
459. See id. art. X.
460. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 273; see Escobar, supra note 61, at 92.
461. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. X(1).
462. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 129.
463. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. X(1).
464. See generally DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 129 (stating that treaties of
the Peoples Republic of China state that the international law applicable to the
resolution of disputes is only that international law recognized by both parties to the
treaty).
465. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, NAFTA arbitration, ICSID Case No.
ARB (AF)198/3, Response of the United States of America to the November 9, 2001
Submissions of the Governments of Canada and Mexico Pursuant to NAFTA Article
1128 (Dec. 7, 2001) (citing RESTATEMENT (THiRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 102(2)).
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law.
466
Constitution, Procedural Rules and Expenses of the
Intergovernmental Arbitral Tribunal
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules"6 7 are specified in the United
States - Honduras treaty as governing the United States - Hon-
duras state-to-state arbitral process.46 The United States - Hon-
duras treaty allows the Parties to employ other arbitral rules or to
modify the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, provided that they both
agree. 469 The arbitrators may also propose modifications to the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, but the objection of either Party
compels strict adherence to the UNCITRAL rules.4 °
United States - Honduras intergovernmental arbitral tribu-
nals will consist of three-member panels.4 1 The Parties must each
appoint an arbitrator of their choice within two months of receipt
of a request for arbitration.472 The Party-appointed arbitrators
then select the third, presumably neutral, arbitrator who will
chair the panel. 473 The arbitral chair must be a national of a third
state.474 The UNCITRL Arbitration Rules relating to the appoint-
ment of three-member arbitral panels apply, "mutatis mutan-
dis,""7 to the appointment of Party-to-Party arbitral panels.476
466. PARRY, supra note 3, at 82.
467. See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, U.N. GAOR 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/
31117 (1976).
468. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. X(1);
McGhie, supra note 11, at 120; DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 125.
469. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. X(1); see
generally Permanent Court of Arbitration: Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes
Between Two States, effective Oct. 20, 1992, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 572 (1993) (based
on the UNCITRAL rules, the Optional Rules "reflect the public international law
character of disputes between states, and diplomatic practice appropriate to such
disputes."); DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 128.
470. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, at art. X(1).
471. See id. at art. X(2); McGhie, supra note 11, at 119; see generally DOLZER &
STEVENS, supra note 93, at 124 (discussing the establishment of arbitral panels).
472. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. X(2);
McGhie, supra note 11, at 119.
473. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. X(2).
474. See id.
475. BLAciKs LAw DiCTIONARY, supra note 286, at 919 ("Lat. With the necessary
changes in points of detail, meaning that matters or things are generally the same,
but to be altered when necessary, as to names, offices, and the like").
476. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. X(2); see
DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 124.
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The only exception is that the Secretary General of ICSID, rather
than the Secretary General of the United Nations, is delegated the
authority to resolve appointments that are not administered by
the Parties or the Party-appointed arbitrators. 7
The United States - Honduras BIT is unique from other
investment treaties in its reference to specific arbitral rules,
rather than obligating the tribunal to determine its own proce-
dure. 478 The agreement is also distinctive in its aim of conducting
the arbitration and achieving an arbitral decision in a relatively
short time period.479 Unless the Parties agree to the contrary, all
submissions must be made and all hearings completed within six
months of the selection of the third arbitrator.4 0 The arbitral
panel must then complete its deliberations and render a decision
no later than two months after receipt of the final submission or
the close of the hearing, whichever is later . 8  Although arbitral
tribunals generally have the authority to extend time constraints,
only the Parties, not the tribunal, may lengthen the periods set in
the United States - Honduras BIT.482
The expenses incurred by the Chair and the other arbitrators,
as well as other costs of the proceedings are presumptively borne
equally by the Parties.48 The United States - Honduras treaty
does extend discretion to the arbitral panel to "direct that a higher
proportion of the costs be paid by one of the Parties." "4
Dispute Resolution Between an Investor and a Party
Article IX of the United States - Honduras treaty is the arti-
cle of foremost consequence for most foreign direct investors.485
Article IX confers on the investor the right to initiate and control
dispute resolution with the host state and expressly sets forth the
rights investors may assert.488 The investor's entitlement to
477. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. X(2).
478. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 126; McGhie, supra note 11, at 120.
479. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 126.
480. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. X(3).
481. See id.
482. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 127.
483. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. X(4); see
generally DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 124 (suggesting that sharing arbitral
costs or having the tribunal assess costs facilitates the independence of the
arbitrators).
484. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. X(4).
485. See McGhie, supra note 11, at 119.
486. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. IX; see
DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 145.
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engage the host state on the international plane flows solely and
directly from the authority conferred in Article IX.1s The United
States - Honduras BIT not only empowers investors to participate
in dispute resolution with the host state, particularly through
international arbitration, but further authorizes the assertion of
claims by investors to be based on substantive provisions of the
United States - Honduras treaty.4 8
Investment disputes subject to the control of an investor are
"dispute[s] between a Party and a national or company of the
other Party arising out of or relating to an investment authoriza-
tion, an investment agreement or an alleged breach of any right
conferred, created or recognized" by the treaty with respect to cov-
ered investments. 4 9 The treaty does not, however, offer guidance
regarding those disputes that should be regarded as "arising out
of or relating to" investment authorizations, investment agree-
ments or the rights conferred, created or recognized by the
treaty, 90 but such disputes should be coterminous with the broad
definition of "investment" in Article I (d).49' The phraseology of
Article IX (1), "arising out of or relating to," particularly the use of
the coordinating conjunction "or" suggests an expansive interpre-
tation.4 92 The language of Article IX (1), when read with the
expansive definition of "investment,"49 3 supports the conclusion
that the Parties intended the phrase "investment dispute" to be
liberally construed.49 4
Balanced against an expansive interpretation of "investment
dispute" is the issue of state sovereignty and the extent to which it
may be accepted that the Parties intended to yield that sover-
eignty to an arbitral tribunal. Disputes that involve business
issues are appropriate for settlement through investor-state dis-
pute resolution. The more fundamentally political an issue, such
as the characterization of a war"' or the legality of the use of
487. See SoRNARA a, supra note 2, at 262.
488. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 146.
489. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. IXl); see
McGhie, supra note 11, at 120; COMEAUX, supra note 14, at 108 (examining Article DC
of the United States prototype investment treaty).
490. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. IX(l).
491. Id. art. I(d).
492. Id. art. IX(1).
493. Id. art. I(d).
494. See generally SoRNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 267 (stating that the type of
disputes that may be arbitrated should be identified in "wide terms").
495. See id. at 262 n.95 (stating that wars involving self-determination are
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force, 9' the less likely it is that the Parties intended to extend to
an investor the right to have that matter addressed in a domestic
court or through the arbitral process.
Investor - State Dispute Resolution Methodology
The United States - Honduras BIT provides investors with
three options to resolve investment disputes with the host state.
Investors may proceed before the domestic courts or administra-
tive bodies of the host state, conclude their differences in accor-
dance with any previously agreed on settlement procedures
applicable to the issues or compel the host state to submit to bind-
ing international arbitration.497 The most important alternative,
that of arbitration in an international forum, is an aspect of
investment treaty practice on which American negotiators have
consistently refused to compromise and is only available through
the treaty."' Binding arbitration may be before the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, if ICSID's juris-
dictional requirements are satisfied, the Additional Facility of
ICSID, if ICSID jurisdiction cannot be established, pursuant to
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or in accordance with any other
arbitral institution or arbitration rules, if agreed to by both the
investor and the host state. 99
Investors may only compel arbitration if they have not previ-
ously instituted action in the host state's domestic legal system or
pursuant to a previously agreed upon method, and "three months"
have passed since the dispute arose. °° If the investor has "previ-
ously submitted the dispute for resolution""' under one of the ini-
tial two options of Article IX (2), that of the local courts or a
previously agreed on dispute-settlement procedure, investor
recourse to arbitration is precluded. °2 The "three month" delay in
"inherently unsuitable for settlement by tribunals constituted to settle investment
disputes").
496. See id. at 263.
497. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. IX(2).
498. See COMEAUX, supra note 14, at 108-09.
499. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art.
IX(3)(b)(i),(ii),(iii) and (iv); McGhie, supra note 11, at 121; Georges R. Delaume,
Consent to ICSID Arbitration, in THE CHANGING WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THE TwE rY-FiRST CENTURY 155, 168 (Joseph J. Norton et al. eds., 1998).
500. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. IX(3)(a); cf.
United States - El Salvador Investment Treaty, supra note 390, art. IX(3)(a) (which
states "ninety days").
501. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. IX(3)(a).
502. See ROBERT, supra note 70, at 11; McGhie, supra note 11, at 121; Escobar,
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instituting arbitration commences to run on "the date on which
the dispute arose."" 3 The United States - Honduras treaty does
not state how it should be decided when a dispute is considered to
have arisen. The date should not be later than the date on which
the investor's rights in the domestic system would commence to
run. Although investors are prevented from commencing arbitra-
tion pursuant to Article IX (3)(a) prior to the elapse of the three-
month period, they are entitled to seek interim injunctive relief
during this period to preserve their rights and interests."4
Injunctive Relief
Investors, pursuant to Article IX (3)(b), may seek interim
injunctive relief through the domestic judicial or administrative
system of the host country.05 Maintenance of the status quo
between the investor and the host state must underlie the interim
request for relief. Referencing the language of the United States -
Honduras treaty, an investor's recourse to injunctive relief must
be solely for the "preservation of its rights and interests."'
Injunctive relief intended to preserve an investor's rights and
interests is relief that does not involve the payment of damages. 7
The United States - Honduras treaty does not define the term
"damages."
Article IX (3)(b) makes it clear that resort to strictly injunc-
tive relief will not negatively impact an investor's option of engag-
ing in binding arbitration. Sub-paragraph (3)(b) provides that a
national or juridical entity may seek interim injunctive relief "not-
withstanding that it may have submitted a dispute to binding
arbitration."08 The United States - Honduras treaty further
states that such relief may be sought "prior to the institution of
the arbitral process or during the proceedings."" 9 Despite having
the right to do so, investors required by their particular circum-
stances to seek injunctive relief against a Party should carefully
limit the request. An expansive prayer for injunctive relief may be
interpreted as seeking the payment of damages, rather than
supra note 61, at 91 (referencing this provision of U.S. BIT practice as the "fork-in-
the-road").
503. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. IX(3)(a).
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merely the preservation of rights and interests, and consequently
be deemed an exercise of the investor's right to dispute resolution
in the domestic legal system."'
Consent to Binding Investor - State Arbitration
ICSID Convention Article 25 (1)511 and the Additional Facility
Rules 12 only extend the jurisdiction of ICSID to "legal dispute[s]
arising directly out of an investment" for which there has been
"consent in writing" to submit the dispute to ICSID."3 ICSID will
not entertain arbitration against a sovereign state absent uncon-
ditional consent set forth in a written instrument.5 4 The United
States - Honduras BIT expressly provides the requisite written
consent in Article IX (4).515
Article IX (4) of the agreement provides that "[each Party
hereby consents to the submission of any investment dispute for
settlement by binding arbitration" in accordance with the election
of the investor." The Parties, through Article IX(4), confirm their
intention that the consent agreed to in the United States - Hondu-
ras treaty satisfies the requirements of the ICSID Convention and
the Additional Facility Rules. 17 The language drawn on by Hon-
duras and the United States does not, as in some treaties, suggest
a willingness to consider arbitration. Rather, it expressly recog-
nizes the Parties' obligations to participate in binding arbitration
before ICSID or pursuant to the Additional Facility Rules."8
Since neither Article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention nor the Addi-
510. See id. art. IX(2)(a).
511. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Aug. 27, 1965, art. 25(1), 17 U.S.T. 1270, 1280, 575
U.N.T.S. 159, 174 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; see generally Antonio R. Parra,
The Role of ICSID in the Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID NEWS, Winter
1999 at 5, available at http: / /www.worldbank.org/icsid /news/ n-16-1-5.htm..
512. See Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of
Proceedings by the Secretariat of the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes, ICSID Doc. 11, art. 4(2) (1979).
513. ICSID Convention, supra note 511, art. 25(1).
514. See Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 4
I.L.M. 524, 527 (stating that consent is the "cornerstone" of the Convention); see also
Delaume, supra note 499, at 166.
515. See McGhie, supra note 11, at 122.
516. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. IX(4); see
Delaume, supra note 499, at 168.
517. See United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. IX(4)(a);
Delaume, supra note 499, at 168.
518. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 132; Delaume, supra note 499, at
165-66.
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tional Facility Rules require that a state's consent be in a particu-
lar instrument or even conferred in the same instrument,
investors whose investment agreements with a host state do not
expressly address consent remain entitled through Article IX (4)
of the United States - Honduras BIT to submit their disputes for
arbitration before ICSID or the Additional Facility.19
Finality and Enforcement of Investor - State Arbitral
Awards
The United States and Honduras expressly sought through
Article IX (6) to eliminate protracted litigation or arbitration and
to facilitate satisfaction of arbitral awards. The Parties provided
that any arbitral award rendered pursuant to Article IX would be
"final and binding on the parties to the dispute."2 ' "The parties,"
as expressed in Article IX (6), refers to both investors and the host
Party, not just the "Parties" to the United States - Honduras
treaty.2 1 The United States - Honduras treaty further provides
that Honduras and the United States are to "carry out without
delay" the provisions of any arbitral award and to provide in their
territories for the enforcement of any arbitral award. 22 The fail-
ure of the Parties to enforce an award rendered pursuant to the
conditions set forth in the United States - Honduras treaty could
constitute a breach of the Treaty and possibly render the Party
directly liable." '
Buttressing the obligation of the Parties to carry out the
terms of any arbitral award are the requirements of Article IX (5).
Article IX (5) mandates that arbitration be held in a country that
is a Party to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "New York Con-
519. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 93, at 131; Delaume, supra note 499, at
156.
520. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. IX (6).
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. See Islamic Republic of Iran and United States, Award No. 586-A27-FT (June
5, 1998), available at http://www.iusct.org/awards/award-586-a27-ft-eng.pdf; see
generally Anuj Desai, Arbitral & Judicial Decision: Case No. A27: The Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal's First Award of Damages for Breach of the Algiers
Declaration, 10 Am. REV. INT'L ARB. 229 (1999) (questioning the decision of the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal rendering an award in favor of Iran and against the
United States for violating the Algiers Declaration. The arbitral award stemmed
from decisions of a U.S. District Court and Court of Appeals declining to recognize
and enforce a previous award of the Claims Tribunal in favor of Iran against a U.S.
national.); McGhie, supra note 11, at 122 (suggesting diplomatic espousal to enforce
an arbitral award),
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vention") 24 in order to ensure, to the extent possible against any
sovereign, that the Parties comply with arbitral awards rendered
against them. 2' The New York Convention enables investors in
whose favor an arbitral award has been rendered, to seek recogni-
tion and enforcement of the award against the assets of the host
Party in any state that is a Party to the New York Convention.
The Parties affirm through Article IX (4) that the treaty consti-
tutes an "agreement in writing"52 as mandated by the New York
Convention. 527 Recognition and enforcement of an award against
Honduras may, however, be complicated by the fact that only the
United States is a Party to the New York Convention.528 Issues of
jurisdiction and sovereign immunity may also hinder the ability of
an investor to obtain ultimate satisfaction of an award.529
Exhaustion of Local Remedies
The local remedies rule, a fundamental principle of customary
international law, calls for the exhaustion of all remedies provided
for by the laws of the host state in advance of recourse to interna-
tional arbitration. 50 The rule is recognition of state sovereignty
over matters within its territory and is implied in investment
treaties that are silent on the issue.5 ' The Court of International
Justice in Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) addressed the obliga-
tion to exhaust local remedies when asserting privileges based on
a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. 2  The ICJ
held that "it was unable to accept that an important principle of
customary international law should be held to have been tacitly
dispensed with, in the absence of any words making clear an
intention to do so.
53
3
524. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in
7 I.L.M. 1042 (1968) [hereinafter New York Convention].
525. See Delaume, supra note 499, at 168.
526. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. IX(4)(b);
Delaume, supra note 499, at 168.
527. See New York Convention, supra note 524, art. II.
528. A review of the World Wide Web site of the United Nations is available at
http://www.unece.org/trade/tips/comarbit/listpart.htm, and it indicates that the
United States is a signatory to the New York Convention, but does not list Honduras.
529. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 269; McGhie, supra note 11, at 121;
Delaume, supra note 499, at 168. See also Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1602 -1611(2000).
530. See SONAaAJAH, supra note 2, at 270; Shihata, supra note 194, at 214.
531. See SomAIAJAH, supra note 2, at 271-72.
532. See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States v. Italy) 1989 I.C.J. 15.
533. Id. at 42.
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The United States - Honduras investment treaty, although
not expressly obviating the local remedies rule, does provide
investors with dispute resolution options that contradict incorpo-
ration of the rule in the treaty. Article IX (2) states that "a party
to an investment dispute may submit the dispute for resolution"
in accordance with the terms set forth in the United States - Hon-
duras treaty."' The options available to an investor through the
BIT include recourse to the domestic legal system of the host
Party, dispute settlement procedures agreed on in advance and
binding arbitration.5 Since the obligation to exhaust local reme-
dies is not expressly dispensed with in the United States - Hondu-
ras treaty, there is the presumption that it should be implied.
Article IX (2) should, however, be interpreted as rebutting this
presumption. Providing an investor with dispute resolution
options directly conflicts with the proposition of the rule. 36 The
intent of Honduras and the United States, as expressed in Article
IX (2), was to eliminate the investor's obligation to exhaust local
remedies prior to electing its course of dispute resolution with the
host state.
CONCLUSION
The development of international commerce from trade
between merchants to direct investment beyond the traditional
borders of the investor's home country has brought with it a rap-
idly evolving legal landscape." ' International dispute resolution,
once the provenance of diplomats and state espousal of claims, is
now the arena of the "transnational adjudicator."538 Providing
investors with the means of advancing their disputed claims with
the host state and recognition of that privilege by investors has
resulted in a proliferation of arbitral claims.-"'
Appreciating the nuances and ambiguities of bilateral invest-
ment treaties is essential to contemporary foreign direct invest-
534. United States - Honduras Investment Treaty, supra note 5, art. IX(2).
535. See id. art. IX(2)(a)-(c).
536. Cf SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 270 (providing that the presence of an
arbitration clause in an investment contract does not, by itself, negate the rule).
537. See Kolker, supra note 442, at 90; see generally Robert L. Pritchard, The
Lawyer's Role in Foreign Direct Investment and the Global Economy, 18 ITr'L Bus. L.
358 (1990).
538. Jacques Werner, International Commercial Arbitration: From Merchants to
Academic to Skilled Professional, Disp. RESOL. MAG. Spring 1998, at 22, 24.
539. See Malcolm Richard Wilkey, Introduction to Dispute Settlement in
International Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, 26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 613
(1995).
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ing. Treaty provisions drafted by skilled diplomats are being
subjected to the scrutiny of talented arbitrators. The strengths
and weaknesses of negotiating positions, and concurrent arbitral
awards, rest on the interpretation of treaty terms that are more
frequently being construed in a legalistic manner. As investor -
state dispute resolution, the recourse of final resort, becomes more
prevalent, knowledge of treaty ambiguities becomes more indis-
pensable and the need for treaties crafted with greater certainty
more evident.
